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Burying Our Heads in the Sand: Lack of Knowledge,
Knowledge Avoidance, and the Persistent Problem of
Campus Peer Sexual Violence
Nancy Chi Cantalupo*
This Article discusses why two laws that seek to prevent and end
sexual violence between students on college campuses, Title IX of the
Educational Amendments of 1972 ("Title IX") and the Jeanne Clery
Disclosure of Campus Security Policy and Campus Crime StatisticsAct
("Clery Act'), are failing to fulfill this goal and how these legal
regimes can be improved to reach their objectives. It explicates how
Title IX and the Clery Act ignore or exacerbate a series of "information
problems" that create incentives for schools to "bury their heads in the
sand" with regardto campus peer sexual violence. These information
problems include: (1) the damage to a school's public image that can
come from increased reportingof the violence; (2) the persistent myth
that such violence is committed mainly by strangers; (3) the lack of
awareness by most school officials about the violence and a school's
legal obligations with regard to preventing the violence; and (4) the
prohibitively expensive broad-based education and training that
correcting such information problems would require. Several legal
deficiencies emerge from this examination, including: (1) problems
arising from the "actual notice" prong of the test created by the

Supreme Court in Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District
and Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education; (2) problems related
to the Department of Education's ("DOE's") administrative
enforcement of Title IX; and (3) problems with the campus crime
reporting provisions of the Clery Act. This Article discusses each
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deficiency in turn, how each serves to enable schools' lack of
knowledge and avoidance of knowledge about peer sexual violence and
how each eitherfails to solve or exacerbates the information problems
faced by schools, students, andparents. Finally, this Article concludes
with a series of recommendationsfor changes that should be made to
Title IX, the Clery Act, and their enforcement regimes to address these
information problems and ultimately to prevent and end the persistent
problem of campus peer sexual violence.
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I. INTRODUCTION

When one of a school's students sexually assaults or is otherwise
sexually violent toward another of the school's students, that school
faces much greater liability from inadequately protecting student
victimsi of such peer sexual violence than schools do from expelling
and otherwise disciplining students found responsible for perpetrating
the violence. This was a central conclusion of an article I authored in
2009,2 in which I comprehensively reviewed the law governing school
liability, both in terms of the school's obligations to the victim and the
accused perpetrator. My review of not only the law but also the social
science research regarding peer sexual violence on college and
university campuses indicated, moreover, that this liability scheme
reflects quite accurately how the problem of campus peer sexual
violence is perpetuated by the college or university itself. Because of
these dynamics, I decided that school processes imitating and drawing
from procedures used in the criminal justice system do not help a school
address campus peer sexual violence and actually create greater risks of
liability for the school. Therefore, I concluded that the law creates an
1. A note about language: I use "victim" and "survivor" interchangeably to refer to people
who claim they have been victims of sexual violence. Therefore, "victim" is not a term of art
used to indicate a finding of responsibility for sexual violence. I may use "accuser" when
discussing the role of the victim/survivor in a disciplinary proceeding. I use "perpetrator" or
"assailant" when someone accused of sexual violence has been found responsible or in
discussions where it can be assumed the person perpetrated the sexual violence, such as statistical
analyses. I use "accused" or "alleged" to refer to those who have been charged but not found
responsible for committing sexual violence. Finally, I use female pronouns to refer to victims
because the majority of victims are women, and male pronouns to refer to perpetrators and
accused students because the majority of perpetrators and accused students are men.
Other than when I am discussing studies or other sources that use terms such as "sexual assault"
or "rape," I use "sexual violence" instead of terms such as "sexual assault" or "rape" because in
my view, "sexual violence" is a broader, more descriptive term that is not a term of art and that I
regard to include a wider range of actions that may not fit certain legal or readers' definitions of
"sexual assault" or "rape." The term therefore includes "sexual assault" or "rape," as well as
other actions involving physical contact of a sexual nature that may not always fit everyone's
definition of "sexual assault" or "rape." While I acknowledge that non-physical actions can
constitute violence, including those forms of violence is outside the scope of this paper. When I
discuss studies or other sources that use terms such as "sexual assault" or "rape," I retain use of
those terms as the original researchers and authors used them.
I use "school" and "institution" to identify either K-12 schools or higher education institutions,
although I use "college," "university," "campus," or "higher education" to refer to the latter
category of schools.
Finally, my definition of "report" and "reporting" is not a technical one. I regard a report as
any time a victim tells any professional with any role or authority to help her about the violence,
including but not limited to medical, counseling, security or conduct-related, residential life or
other student affairs personnel, as well as faculty and community or campus advocates.
2. Nancy Chi Cantalupo, Campus Violence: Understanding the Extraordinary Through the

Ordinary, 35 J.C. & U.L. 613 (2009), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract id=1457343.
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incentive for schools to disassociate their internal processes and
procedures related to student misconduct from a criminal model and to
create a sui generis administrative model that responds to the goals and
powers of schools, not those of a coercive state.
Nevertheless, a wide variety of sources indicate that many colleges
and universities appear to act exactly opposite to their legal incentives
when it comes to responding to the widespread problem of campus peer
sexual violence. A growing number of private lawsuits, complaints
filed with the Department of Education ("DOE" or "Department"), and
news reports indicate that schools often respond in ways that are both
violative of the law and unhelpful in ending the violence. These sources
include an in-depth, nine-month investigation of campus peer sexual
violence, conducted by the Center for Public Integrity ("CPI") in late
2009 and early 2010, with companion pieces by National Public Radio,
four regional news networks, and Nightline.3 The CPI study simply
confirms what many lawyers, faculty, and administrators involved in
cases of campus peer sexual violence, both within and outside of
schools, say: that school adjudications of campus peer sexual violence
cases are "kangaroo courts" with the deck stacked in favor of the
alleged perpetrator, and that a survivor of campus peer sexual violence
needs independent representation because she cannot rely on her school
to protect her rights. 4 These impressions are further confirmed by the
facts of various cases litigated under Title IX of the Educational
Amendments of 1972 ("Title IX"), cases decided under the test for
school liability set out in Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School
District and Davis v. Monroe County Board ofEducation.6

3.

Cynthia McFadden, Many Campus Assault Victims Stay Quiet, or Fail to Get Help, ABC

NEWS NIGHTLINE (Sept. 6, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/Nightline/college-campus-assaultsconstant-threat/story?id= 11410988; Sexual Assault on Campus: A FrustratingSearchfor Justice,
CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (Feb. 24, 2010), http://www.publicintegrity.org/investigations/campus

assault/.
4. See, e.g., Kristen Lombardi, A Lack of Consequencesfor Sexual Assault, CTR. FOR PUB.

INTEGRITY (Feb. 24, 2010), http://www.publicintegrity.org/investigations/campus assault/
articles/entry/1945/ (quoting a victim characterizing her university's handling of her case as a
"kangaroo trial with a kangaroo sanction"); Kristen Lombardi, Sexual Assault on Campus
Shrouded in Secrecy, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (Dec. 1, 2009), http://www.publicintegrity.

org/investigations/campus assault/articles/entry/1838/ (quoting a campus administrator likening
campus judicial proceedings to "star chambers"). The comments listed here are just the tip of the
iceberg of comments that have been shared with me during my fifteen-plus years of experience
working on these issues. However, to the extent that many of these comments were made by
various university employees in settings not involving a journalistic investigation or other settings
where the speaker might expect them to be made public, they cannot be cited with specificity.
5. 524 U.S. 274 (1998).
6. 526 U.S. 629 (1999).
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Accordingly, this Article explores why many schools have a tendency
to act against their own liability interests in the area of campus peer
sexual violence and asks how the law does or does not encourage
schools to act in this fashion. Part II reviews what is known about both
campus peer sexual violence and how many colleges and universities
handle reports of such violence. This review reveals that colleges and
universities face serious information problems when it comes to campus
peer sexual violence that create incentives opposite to those created by
the existing liability structure. At best, these information problems
cause schools to be generally unaware of the laws and the underlying
campus peer sexual violence problem and, at worst, create
countervailing incentives for schools to actively avoid knowledge of
both.
Part III then examines what, if anything, the law does to alleviate or
exacerbate these information problems and the incentives that can arise
from them. Several legal deficiencies emerge from this examination,
including problems arising from the Gebser/Davistest, problems related
to the DOE's administrative enforcement of Title IX, and problems with
the campus crime reporting provisions of the Jeanne Clery Disclosure of
Campus Security Policy and Campus Crime Statistics Act ("Clery
Act"). Part III discusses each of these deficiencies as well as how they
serve to enable the lack of knowledge and avoidance of knowledge by
schools about peer sexual violence happening on their campuses. Part
III concludes with a description of how each deficiency fails to solve
the information problems faced by schools, students, and parents.
Finally, Part IV discusses various changes that need to be made to
existing laws and enforcement regimes for the incentive structures
surrounding campus peer sexual violence to be influenced in a
meaningful way. Although school liabilities under Title IX, the Clery
Act, and constitutional law related to accused students' due process
rights clearly encourage schools to address the campus peer sexual
violence problem in a meaningful and responsible way, the information
problems discussed in this Article create quite opposite incentivesincentives that account in part for the collective failure over the last
three decades to end or significantly prevent the epidemic of peer sexual
violence that afflicts the nation's campuses.
II. CAMPUS PEER SEXUAL VIOLENCE: THE PROBLEM AND THE
INFORMATION PROBLEMS

Is it fair to characterize campus peer sexual violence as an epidemic?
The statistics suggest that it is. Comprehensive studies on campusbased, peer sexual violence that have been completed over the last
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several decades have consistently found that 20-25% of college women
are victims of attempted or completed nonconsensual sex during their
time in college.7 Because so few male victims report instances of
abuse, there is a limited amount of information about the extent of
campus peer sexual violence against men. Despite the low rate of male
victim reporting, statistics do show that when men are raped, it is
usually done by other men.8
These statistics also suggest that college and university women are
particularly vulnerable to sexual violence:
Women ages 16 to 24 experience rape at rates four times higher than
the assault rate of all women, making the college (and high school)
years the most vulnerable for women. [Furthermore,] college women
are more at risk for rape and other forms of sexual assault than women
the same age but not in college.9

7.

CHRISTOPHER P. KREBS ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE CAMPUS SEXUAL ASSAULT

STUDY: FINAL REPORT 5-3 (Oct. 2007), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/
grants/221153.pdf (finding that 19% of students in the sample had experienced attempted or
completed sexual assault since entering college, but noting that over 50% of the sample had
completed less than two years of college and therefore discussing the incidence reported by
college seniors, where 26% had experienced attempted or completed sexual assault since entering
college, to predict a woman's risk during her overall college career); Brenda J. Benson et al.,
College Women and Sexual Assault: The Role of Sex-Related Alcohol Expectancies, 22 J. FAM.
ViOLENCE 341, 348 (2007); see also CAROL BOHMER & ANDREA PARROT, SEXUAL ASSAULT ON
CAMPUS: THE PROBLEM AND THE SOLUTION 6 (Lexington Books 1993) (noting that data from
studies from the mid-1980s reveal that between 20-25% of college women have experienced
forced sex); BONNIE S. FISHER ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE SEXUAL VICTIMIZATION OF
COLLEGE WOMEN 10 (2000), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/182369.pdf
(explaining how the study measured victimization for only half a year and thus projected results
for an entire school year may be significantly higher). Although some of the studies that are cited
here are somewhat old, they are included because the findings of the older studies are quite
consistent with the most recent ones, even when the studies have been conducted in different
decades. This indicates that the findings of older studies are still valid in terms of what we see
today.
8. RANA SAMPSON, ACQUAINTANCE RAPE OF COLLEGE STUDENTS 3 (2003), available at
http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/e0302l472.pdf; see BOHMER & PARROT, supra note 7, at 6
(noting that between ten and fifteen percent of males report being forced to have sex).
9. SAMPSON, supra note 8, at 2. But see KATRINA BAUM & PATSY KLAUS, BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, VIOLENT VICTIMIZATION OF COLLEGE STUDENTS, 1995-2002, at 3 (2005),
available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/vvcs02.pdf (finding that college students
were less likely to be the victim of sexual assault than non-students). The discrepancy in these
two findings is due to the wording of questions asked during data collection. The conclusions of
Baum and Klaus are based on the National Crime Victimization Survey, which gathers
information on sexual assault by asking category-centered questions, such as "Has anyone
attacked or threatened you in [this way]: rape, attempted rape or other type of sexual attack?" Id.
The conclusions that Sampson cites are based on studies such as the National College Women
Sexual Victimization study, which use behavior-oriented questions such as "Has anyone made
you have sexual intercourse by using force or threatening to harm you or someone close to you?"
See FISHER ET AL., supra note 7, at 6, 13 (explicitly comparing the difference between the
National Crime Victimization Survey methodology and results and the National College Women
Sexual Victimization study methodology and results). Other than the wording of the questions,
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Moreover, sexual assaults most often happen at times when college
women are most vulnerable: during a victim's first two years in
college,10 often during the first week they are on campus. 1
The vast majority of sexual violence that student victims experience
is not at the hands of a stranger, but of someone they know. 12 In one
study, 12.8% of completed rapes, 35% of attempted rapes, and 22.9% of
threatened rapes took place on a date. 13 Typical perpetrators include
classmates, friends of the survivor, and boyfriends or ex-boyfriends. 14
Studies on college men indicate that 6-14.9% of them "report acts
that meet legal definitions for rape or attempted rape"I 5 and that a small
number of repeat perpetrators commit most of the sexual violence and
likely contribute to other violence problems as well. For example, a
2002 study surveyed 1882 male students at a university and found that
6.4% self-reported acts qualified as rape or attempted rape.16 Of this
group, 63.3% reported committing repeat rapes, averaging about six
rapes per perpetrator.17 In addition, these "undetected" (i.e., not
arrested or prosecuted) rapists each committed an average of fourteen
additional acts of interpersonal violence (which includes battery,
physical and/or sexual abuse of children, and sexual assault short of
rape or attempted rape), meaning that 4% of the students in the study
accounted for 28% of the violence, nearly ten times that of non-rapists
(1.41 acts of violence per person) and 3.5 times that of single-act rapists
(3.98 acts of violence per person). 18 A more limited study in 1987
revealed that ninety-six college men accounted for 187 rapes.' 9

the basic methodology of the two studies was identical, yet behavior-oriented questions have been
found to produce eleven times the number of reported rapes. Id at 11.
10.

See KREBS ET AL., supra note 7, at xiv (noting that the risk for forced sexual assault was

greater for freshmen and sophomores than for juniors and seniors).
11. BOHMER & PARROT, supra note 7, at 26.
12. Id. at 26; see FISHER ET AL., supra note 7, at 17 (reporting that about nine in ten offenders

were known to the victim); KREBS ET AL., supra note 7, at 5-18 (stating that only a small portion
of victims reported being assaulted by a stranger).
13.

FISHER ET AL., supra note 7, at 17.

14. See id. at 19 (noting that for completed rapes, 35.5% of offenders were classmates, 34.2%
were friends, 23.7% were boyfriends or ex-boyfriends, and 2.6% were acquaintances, and that for
attempted rapes, 43.5% of offenders were classmates, 24.2% were friends, 14.5% were
boyfriends or ex-boyfriends, and 9.7% were acquaintances); see also KREBS ET AL., supra note 7,

at 5-15 (finding that 21.7% of offenders were classmates/fellow students, 24.3% were friends,
17.8% were boyfriends, 20.0% were ex-boyfriends, and 27.9% were acquaintances).
15. David Lisak & Paul M. Miller, Repeat Rape and Multiple Offending Among Undetected
Rapists, 17 VIOLENCE& VICTIMS 73, 73 (2002).

16. Id. at 78.
17.

Id.

18. Id.
19. MARTIN D. SCHWARTZ & WALTER S. DEKESEREDY, SEXUAL ASSAULT ON THE COLLEGE
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Other studies, as well as news items from various campuses, indicate
that there are many rape-supportive attitudes among college men. For
instance, in October 2010, a Yale fraternity had its pledges chant
outside the university's Women's Center, "No means yes! Yes means
anal!" 20 This incident was not an isolated one, but was merely a repeat
of an incident involving fraternity men, the campus Women's Center,
and the same chant in 2006.21 A student member of the Women's
Center said that such incidents "tend to repeat themselves every year or
two" at Yale 22 and that the October 2010 incident spurred a group of
Yale students to file a Title IX complaint against the university.2 3
Moreover, sociological studies have confirmed wide subscription to
such attitudes among college men beyond those at Yale. A 2001 study
found significant peer support for sexual violence among college men.2 4
A 1993 study found that 5-8% of college men commit rape knowing it
is wrong, 2 5 10-15% of college men commit rape without knowing that
it is wrong, 26 and (citing a similar study in 1981) 35% of college men
indicated some likelihood that they would rape if they could be assured
of getting away with it. 27 Finally, a 1987 study indicated that 30% of
men in general say they would commit rape and 50% would "force a
woman into having sex" if they would not get caught.28
As indicated, these studies suggest linkages between such cultural
attitudes and the actual occurrence of campus peer sexual violence.
Multiple studies have shown that perpetrators share characteristics such
as macho attitudes, high levels of anger towards women, the need to
dominate women, hyper-masculinity, antisocial behavior and traits, lack
of empathy, and abuse of alcohol. 29 The 2001 study mentioned above
CAMPUS: THE ROLE OF MALE PEER SUPPORT 12 (1997).
20. Michael Kimmel, The Men, And Women, of Yale, MS. MAG. BLOG (Oct. 17, 2010),

http://msmagazine.com/blog/blog/2010/10/17/the-men-and-women-of-yale/.
21. Id.
22.

Jordi Gasso & Sam Greenberg, DKE Apologizes for Pledge Chants, YALE DAILY NEWS

(Oct. 15, 2010), http://www.yaledailynews.com/news/2010/oct/15/dke-apologizes-for-pledgechants/.
23. Yale is Subject ofa Title IX Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2011, at Al7.
24. Martin D. Schwartz et al., Male Peer Support and a Feminist Routine Activities Theory:
UnderstandingSexual Assault on the College Campus, 18 JUST. Q. 623, 641 (2001).
25. BOHMER & PARROT, supra note 7, at 21.
26. Id. at 6.
27. Id. at 8.
28. ROBIN WARSHAW, I NEVER CALLED IT RAPE 97 (1988).

29. See, e.g., BOHMER & PARROT, supra note 7, at 23 (noting that athletes and fraternity
members are more likely to be offenders because of their use of alcohol); Lisak & Miller, supra
note 15, at 73 (stating that common characteristics shared by offenders include high levels of
anger at women, the need to dominate women, hyper-masculinity, lack of empathy, and
psychopathy and antisocial traits); Schwartz et al., supra note 24, at 628 (noting that the sexist
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indicates that, especially in light of the lack of strong anti-violence
messages from campus authority figures, male peer support for sexual
violence likely encourages some men to perpetrate such violence who
might not otherwise do so.30
With this rate of peer sexual violence, why does the general public
appear to know so little about it, or at least about its full scope? The
surface reason is because 90% or more of sexual assault survivors on
college campuses do not report the assault.3 1 However, this reason begs
the further question: Why do survivors not report? The vast majority of
the reasons that victims provide involve victims' fears that they will not
be believed or will face hostile treatment, especially from authority
figures. Fear of hostile treatment or disbelief by legal and medical
authorities prevents 24.7% of college rape survivors from reporting. 32
Other factors include not seeing the incidents as harmful, not thinking a
crime had been committed, not thinking what happened was serious
enough to involve law enforcement, not wanting family or others to
know, lack of proof, and the belief that no one will believe them and
nothing will happen to the perpetrator. 33 Moreover, the stakes of a
victim's report not being credited are quite high for the victim. Not
being believed and official mishandling can increase survivor trauma. 34
Not reporting or telling anyone about the assault, however, can hurt the
survivor further. 35 In contrast, both speaking with someone about the
assault and reporting it can be therapeutic 36 and a necessary step to
recovery.37
Given that studies on attitudes of law enforcement, judges, juries, and
prosecutors indicate that survivors' fears are often well-founded, 38 it is
nature of many police organizations leads to patterns of victimization).
30. Schwartz et al., supra note 24, at 630, 641.
31.
32.

FISHERETAL., supranote 7, at 24.
Id. at 23; see also BOHMER & PARROT, supra note 7, at 13, 63 (noting that many victims

do not report the offense because they know the college does not take complaints seriously);
WARSHAW, supranote 28, at 50 (noting disbelief that reporting the offense is effective).
33. BOHMER & PARROT, supra note 7, at 13, 63; FISHER ET AL., supra note 7, at 23-24;
WARSHAW, supra note 28, at 50.
34. See BOHMER & PARROT, supra note 7, at 5, 198 (noting that when the offender is

acquitted, the victim may suffer more severely because lack of belief by others can increase the
trauma).
35.
36.
37.

WARSHAW, supra note 28, at 66.
BOHMER & PARROT, supra note 7, at 235.
WARSHAW, supra note 28, at 66.

38. See BEYOND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: USING THE LAW TO HELP RESTORE THE
LIVES OF SEXUAL ASSAULT VICTIMS, A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR ATrORNEYS AND ADVOCATES 8

(Jessica E. Mindlin et al. eds., 2008) (showing how studies indicate authorities are confused about
what constitutes consensual sex and what the boundary is between sex and sexual assault); see
also Lisak & Miller, supra note 15, at 74 (noting the continuing perception within the criminal
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quite understandable that survivors would avoid reporting. Stories
culled from news reports and cases indicate that survivors who report at
many colleges and universities fare no better-possibly worse-than
those who engage the criminal justice system. The treatment that
victims can often expect from their schools when they make a report
includes the following:
(1) The school does nothing at all; 3 9
(2) The school talks to the alleged perpetrator, who denies the
allegations, makes no determination as to which story is more
credible, 40 and then does nothing, including nothing to protect the
victim from any retaliation from the alleged perpetrator or his friends
as a result of her report;41

justice system that rapes committed by undetected rapists are somehow less serious than rapes by
strangers).
39. See, e.g., Kristin Jones, Barriers Curb Reporting on Campus Sexual Assault: Lack of
Response Discourages Victims ofRape, Other Crimes, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (Dec. 2, 2009),

http://www.publicintegrity.org/investigations/campus-assault/articles/entry/1822/ (describing the
lack of response by school administrators after one victim's report of sexual assault). For cases
demonstrating instances of school officials ignoring or brushing aside victim's complaints, see
S.G. v. Rockford Bd. of Educ., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95522, at *15-16 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 24,
2008); James v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 1-007, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82199, at *6 (W.D. Okla.
Oct. 16, 2008); Bruning v. Carroll Cmty. Sch. Dist., 486 F. Supp. 2d 892, 915-16 (N.D. Iowa
2007); Bashus v. Plattsmouth Cmty. Sch. Dist., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56565, at *10 (D. Neb.
Aug. 3, 2006); Doe v. Derby Bd. of Educ., 451 F. Supp. 2d 438, 447-48 (D. Conn. 2006); Doe v.
E. Haven Bd. of Educ., 430 F. Supp. 2d 54, 63-65 (D. Conn. 2006), affd, 200 F. App'x 46, 49
(2d Cir. 2006); Martin v. Swartz Creek Cmty. Schools, 419 F. Supp. 2d 967, 974 (E.D. Mich.
2006); Jones v. Ind. Area Sch. Dist., 397 F. Supp. 2d 628, 645-46 (W.D. Pa. 2005); Theno v.
Tonganoxie Unified Sch. Dist. No. 464, 394 F. Supp. 2d 1299, 1301 (D. Kan. 2005); Ray v.
Antioch Unified Sch. Dist., 107 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1170 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
40. See, e.g., S.S. v. Alexander, 177 P.3d 724, 740 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008) (finding that the
school acted with "deliberate indifference" when it failed to address the student's complaint);
Letter from John E. Palomino, Reg'1 Civil Rights Dir., S.F., Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep't of
Educ., to Robin Wilson, President, Cal. State Univ., Chico (Oct. 23, 1991) (noting that the
university failed to make a credibility determination between the alleged victim and the harasser).
41. For examples of instances where the victim reported the rape to a school official or some
other authority figure, but the school did nothing to prevent the offender or his friends from
continually coming in contact with the victim, see Patterson v. Hudson Area Sch., 2009 U.S. App.
LEXIS 25, at *33 (6th Cir. 2009); Doe v. Brimfield Grade Sch., 552 F. Supp. 2d 816, 823 (C.D.
Ill. 2008); Doe v. Hamden Bd. of Educ., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40269, at *17 (D. Conn. May 19,
2008); M. v. Stamford Bd. of Educ., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51933, at *28 (D.Conn. 2008);
James, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82199, at *6; S.G., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95522 at *10, *14-15;
Bashus, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56565, at *10-11; Derby Bd of Educ., 451 F. Supp. 2d at 44445; Doe v. Erskine Coll., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35780, at *39 (D.S.C. May 25, 2006); E. Haven
Bd ofEduc., 430 F. Supp. 2d at 59-60; Martin, 419 F. Supp. 2d at 974; Jones, 397 F. Supp. 2d at
645-46; Theno, 394 F. Supp. 2d at 1310-11; Letter from Charlene F. Furr, Operations Officer,
Dall., Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep't of Educ., to Jimmy D. Hattabaugh, Superintendent,
Mansfield Sch. Dist. (Apr. 16, 2007) (on file with author); Letter from Cathy H. Lewis, Acting
Dir., Policy & Enforcement Serv., Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep't of Educ., to Thomas
Crawford, Superintendent, Acad. Sch. Dist. (Apr. 16, 1993) (on file with author).
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(3) The school waits or investigates so slowly that it takes months or
years for the survivor to get any redress; 42
(4) School officials investigate in a biased way, such as throufh their
treatment of the survivor or characterization of her case, or by
setting up fact-finding procedures and hearings with significantly
more procedural rights for the accused than the survivor;44
(5) School officials investigate and determine that the sexual violence
did occur, but do not discipline or minimally disci line the assailant
and do not protect the survivor from any retaliation; 5
42. See, e.g., Williams v. Bd. of Regents, 477 F.3d 1282, 1297 (1lth Cir. 2007) (finding the
school took eight months to respond to reports of a gang rape); Letter from Frankie Furr, Team
Leader, Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep't of Educ., to James E. Nelson, Superintendent,
Richardson Indep. Sch. Dist. (Aug. 5, 2005) (on file with author) [hereinafter Richardson Indep.
Sch. Dist. Letter] (explaining that the victim reported an incident of sexual harassment on January
22, 2003, and the school failed to acknowledge the report until March); Letter from Thomas J.
Hibino, Reg'1 Civil Rights Dir., Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep't of Educ., to Daniel Kehoe,
Superintendent, Mills Pub. Sch. (May 19, 1994) (on file with author) [hereinafter Millis Pub. Sch.
Letter] (explaining the OCR's finding of sex discrimination by the school after the it failed to take
"sufficient prompt and effective action"); Letter from Charles R. Love, Program Manager, Office
for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep't of Educ., to Glenn Roquemore, President, Irvine Valley College (Jan.
28, 2003) (on file with author) (noting that the victim's charge of sex discrimination took nearly
one year for the school to investigate due to inadequate processes for evaluating complaints).
43. For more details on cases in which the school conducted a biased investigation, see
Patterson,2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 25, at *4; Brimfield Grade Sch., 552 F. Supp. 2d at 823; S.S.,
177 P.3d at 740; Siewert v. Spencer-Owen Cmty. Sch. Corp., 497 F. Supp. 2d 942, 954 (S.D. Ind.
2007); Erskine, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35780, at *33-34; Theno, 394 F. Supp. 2d at 1310-11;
Kelly v. Yale Univ., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4543, at *3 (D. Conn. Mar. 26, 2003); Richardson
Indep. Sch. Dist. Letter, supra note 42; Letter from John E. Palomino, Reg'l Civil Rights Dir.,
S.F., Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep't of Educ., to Ruben Armifiana, President, Sonoma State
Univ. (Apr. 29, 1994) (on file with author) [hereinafter Sonoma State Univ. Letter].
44. See Letter from Gary D. Jackson, Reg'l Civil Rights Dir., Office for Civil Rights, U.S.
Dep't of Educ., to Jane Jervis, President, The Evergreen State Coll. (Apr. 4, 1995) (on file with
author) [hereinafter Evergreen State Coll. Letter] (noting that the school had inequitable
procedural rights for discrimination complaints and failed to comply with Title IX, which requires
that complaints be resolved promptly and equitably).
45. For cases demonstrating this proposition, see Vance v. Spencer County Pub. Sch. Dist.,
231 F.3d 253, 262 (6th Cir. 2000); S.S., 177 P.3d at 739 2008; Hamden, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
40269, at *5; Stamford, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51933, at *28; Siewert, 497 F. Supp. 2d at 954;
Derby Bd. ofEduc., 451 F. Supp. 2d at 447; Doe v. Oyster River Coop. Sch. Dist., 992 F. Supp.
467, 481 (D.N.H. 1997); see also Millis Pub. Sch. Letter, supra note 42 (noting that after the
victims informed the school, the principal simply spoke to the perpetrators about the sexual
violence but did nothing further); Sonoma State Univ. Letter, supranote 43 (stating that after the
victim reported the sexual violence she experienced, the university declared it was only a
"miscommunication" and failed to take any further action); Letter from Patricia Shelton, Branch
Chief, and C. Mack Hall, Div. Dir., Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep't of Educ., to James C.
Enochs, Superintendent, Modesto City Schools (Dec. 10, 1993) (on file with author) (finding that
once the victims told the principal, school officials did nothing more than lecture the assailants
about their actions); Kristen Lombardi, A Lack of Consequences for Sexual Assault: Students
Found "Responsible" Face Modest Penalties, While Victims are Traumatized, CTR. FOR PUB.

INTEGRITY (Feb. 24, 2010), http://www.publicintegrity.org/investigations/campus-assault/
articles/entry/1945/ (explaining that at many campuses, abusive students are rarely disciplined,
and when they are, it is rarely more than a slap on the wrist).
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(6) School officials investigate and determine that the sexual violence
did occur and proceed to remove the victim from classes, housing, or
transportation services where she would encounter her assailant,
resulting in significant disruption to the victim's education but none to
the assailant's; 46
(7) School officials tell the victim not to tell anyone else, including
parents and the police;4 7
(8) School officials hold a hearing to determine whether the
allegations are true, find the perpetrator responsible, and then tell the
victim she cannot tell anyone about the findings or she will be brought
up on disciplinary charges; 4 8
(9) School officials require or pressure the survivor to confront her
assailant or go through mediation with him before allowing her to file
a complaint for investigation;4 9
(10) School officials distribute a press packet to local media about a
survivor after she reports an assault, stating that she was charged by
the school with alcohol consumption and "disorderly conduct" in
connection with the events at issue in her report; 50
46. See, e.g., Siewert, 497 F. Supp. 2d at 954 (noting that after the victim was repeatedly
harassed and assaulted, the school moved the victim to a different classroom "rather than deal
with the other student's threats and actions"); James v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 1-007, 2008 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 82199, at *6 (W.D. Okla. 2008) (finding that although the school was aware of
ongoing, sexual harassment of the victim, the only action the school took was to remove the
victim from the class in which some of the alleged harassment occurred).
47. See, e.g., Murrell v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 186 F.3d 1238, 1248 (10th Cir. 1999) (noting that
after a male student repeatedly raped a student with spastic cerebral palsy, the school did not
inform, and told the victim not to inform, her mother); Oyster River Coop. Sch. Dist., 992 F.
Supp. at 479 (finding that a school's guidance counselor told two sexual harassment victims not
to tell their parents because it could subject the school to lawsuits).
48. Press Release, Sec. on Campus, Inc., Georgetown Univ. Violated Rights Of Rape Victims
According To Fed. Review (July 27, 2004), available at http://www.securityoncampus.org/index
.php?option=comcontent&view=article&id=1 96:press-release-georgetown-university-violated[hereinafter
rights-of-rape-victims-according-to-federal-review-&catid=1:soc-news&Itemid=79
Sec. on Campus, Georgetown Univ. Violation]; Letter from Nancy Paula Gifford, Area Case Dir.,
U.S. Dep't of Educ., to S. Daniel Carter, Senior Vice President, Sec. on Campus, Inc. (Nov. 3,
2008), availableat http://www.uvavictimsofrape.com/images/CleryAct Ruling.pdf.
49. See, e.g., S.S., 177 P.3d at 740 (highlighting how the school's continuing suggestion that
the victim leave her job and allowing the perpetrator to remain, contributed to the school acting
with deliberate indifference); Letter from Alan D. Hughes, Attomey-Advisor, Office for Civil
Rights, U.S. Dep't of Educ., to Susan Whittle, Superintendent, Golden City R-III (Sept. 14, 2008)
(on file with author) (noting that Level I of the District's written procedure policy may require an
individual to confront her harasser before initiating a grievance, which violates OCR policy);
Jones, supra note 39 (stating how mediation is discouraged by the Justice and Education
Departments and should never be used because it presumes an equality of power that is not
present in sexual assault cases); Lombardi, supra note 4 (highlighting a University of Virginia
student who was encouraged by university deans to use mediation instead of a hearing and how
the student refused because she did not want to talk to her assailant).
50. Kristin Jones, Lax Enforcement of Title IX in Campus Sexual Assault Cases: Feeble
Watchdog Leaves Students at Risk, Critics Say, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (Feb. 25, 2010),

http://www.publicintegrity.org/investigations/campus assault/articles/entry/1946/
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(11) School officials set up a football recruitment program where
players and recruits are "shown a good time" by female college
students and keep the program going even in the face of multiple
reports that the female students are being raped by players and
recruits;51 and/or
(12) School officials admit or readmit student athletes even with
knowledge that they have past criminal or disciplinary violations,
including sexual violence. 5 2
These behaviors run counter to what the law requires, and, indeed,
many of the examples listed above come from court cases where
schools were found to have violated Title IX (or at least a court allowed
the case to proceed to a jury to determine whether Title LX was
Others come from news stories, particularly Kristen
violated).
Lombardi's excellent series for CPI,5 3 and from DOE investigations. It
is clear from these various sources that schools are regularly acting
contrary to the law.
Furthermore, when schools are sued for such mishandling, the
settlements can often be quite large. For instance, in Simpson v.
University of ColoradoBoulder,54 when two college women were gangraped as a part of an unsupervised football recruiting program, and the
university had evidence the program was leading to sexual violence, the
university ultimately paid a total of $2.85 million to the plaintiffs, hired
a special Title IX analyst, and fired some thirteen university officials,
including the President and football coach. 55 In a case where a student
Lax Enforcement of Title 1X] (citing Letter from Carolyn F. Lazaris, Program/Admin. Manager,

U.S. Dep't. of Educ., Office for Civil Rights, to John Silber, President, Boston University (Apr.
25, 2003), available at http://www.publicintegrity.org/investigations/campusassault/assets/pdf/
Bufinding.pdf).
51. Simpson v. Univ. of Colo. Boulder, 500 F.3d 1170, 1184 (10th Cir. 2007) (finding that the
football coach "maintained an unsupervised player-host program to show high school recruits 'a
good time"' despite knowing generally "of the serious risk of sexual harassment and assault
during college-football recruiting efforts; . . . that such assaults had indeed occurred during CU
recruiting visits; ... [and] that there had been no change in atmosphere since" the last assault).
52. Williams v. Bd. of Regents, 477 F.3d 1282, 1289 (11th Cir. 2007) (denying the school's
motion to dismiss after finding it recruited and admitted the alleged rapist to the school even
though the coach, athletics director, and president knew that he had criminal and disciplinary
problems, including sexually violent behavior); J.K. v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 83855, at *13 (D. Ariz. Sept. 29, 2008) (denying summary judgment when a student
athlete was expelled, in part because of sexual harassment, from a "Summer Bridge Program" but
then re-admitted to Arizona State University as a freshman, only to be found responsible for
sexually assaulting another student during his first year on campus).
53.

Sexual Assault on Campus, THE CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (Feb. 24, 2010), http://www

.publicintegrity.org/investigations/campus assault/.
54. Simpson, 500 F.3d at 1170.
55. See Diane L. Rosenfeld, Changing Social Norms? Title IX and Legal Activism:
Concluding Remarks, 31 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 407, 418 (2008) (explaining that the University

of Colorado Boulder "settled the case paying $2.5 million to Simpson and another $350,000 to
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was raped and murdered at Eastern Michigan University and the
university suspected a fellow student but failed to inform the school and
victim's family of its suspicion for several months, the school
eventually agreed to pay $350,000 in fines for thirteen separate
violations of the Clery Act and settled with the victim's family for $2.5
million. 5 6 The case further led to the termination of the President, Vice
President for Student Affairs, and Director of Public Safety,57 and an
estimated $3.8 million in total costs.58 Other large settlements include
an $850,000 settlement by Arizona State University in a case where a
football player, who had been expelled for misconduct including sexual
harassment, was readmitted after an intervention by the coach and
subsequently raped a student.5 9 In addition, the University of Georgia
paid a six-figure settlement to a plaintiff who was raped by several
athletes, including a student-athlete the university knew had a criminal
record before admitting him to the university. 60 In light of such large
the other plaintiff.

..

. agreed to hire a special Title IX analyst . . . to oversee the implementation

of new policies and procedures regarding sex equality on campus. . . . [and fired] thirteen
university officials and administrators, including the President of the University and Coach Gary
Barnett.").
56. See Geoff S. Larcom, Eastern Michigan University to Pay $350,000 in FederalFines

Over Laura Dickinson Case, MLIVE.COM (June 6, 2008, 9:25 AM), http://blog.mlive.com/
annarbornews/2008/06/easternmichigan universityto.html (explaining that the fine imposed on
the university was the highest fine ever imposed for Clery Act violations by the U.S. Department
of Education when it was cited for "an egregious violation" by failing to warn the public about
the murder and that in total, the university was cited for thirteen violations, "including failing to
issue a timely warning in the death of Dickinson, various policy shortcomings and failing to
properly disclose certain crime statistics").
57.

See Marisa Schultz, EMU Murder TrialBegins Today, DETROIT NEWS, Oct. 15, 2007, at

B 1 (explaining that as a result of numerous complaints regarding the university's approach to
handling the murder, the university's board of regents fired the Vice President of Student Affairs,
the Public Safety Director, and the university's President).
58. Marisa Schultz, Controversy to Cost EMU $1 Million-University to Pay Severance to
Ousted Officials, Legal Fees, Fines Over Handlingof Slaying, DETROIT NEWS, July 19, 2007, at

lB. In addition to the Clery-related DOE investigation, OCR also investigated EMU's violations
of Title IX and published its Letter of Finding in December 2010. See Letter from Catherine D.
Criswell, Dir., U.S. Dep't. of Educ. Office for Civil Rights, to Gloria A. Hage., Gen. Counsel, E.
Mich. Univ. (Nov. 22, 2010), available at http://www2.ed.gov/aboutloffices/list/ocr/docs/
investigations/l 5096002-a.pdf.
59.

Tessa Muggeridge, ASU Settlement Ends in $850,000 Payoff, STATE PRESS (Feb. 3, 2009),

In another case, when another ASU student
http://www.statepress.com/archive/node/4020.
claimed she was raped, the University knew that there was a pattern of sexual violence, and the
suspected mishandling of the investigation by campus police made criminal charges impossible.
Kyle Patton & Joseph Schmidt, Former Student Sues ABOR over Sexual Assault Case, STATE

PRESS (July 18, 2010, 3:46 PM), http://www.statepress.com/2010/07/18/former-student-suesabor-over-sexual-assault-case/.
60. See Rosenfeld, supra note 55, at 420-21 ("[T]he school knowingly recruited an athlete
with a history of sexual misconduct who later sexually assault another student. . . . [T]he coaches
went out of their way to gain admission of the student athlete; pulling strings to get others higher
up in the administration to approve of the admission[] and even grant scholarships to [the student]
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fines and settlements, it is baffling to see schools regularly acting
against their clear interests in avoiding quite expensive liability. It
appears as though something else is going on, and indeed, it is.
The rate of campus peer sexual violence and the high non-reporting
rate perpetuate a cycle whereby perpetrators commit sexual violence
because they think they will not get caught or because they actually
have not been caught. As a result of survivors not reporting the
violence, perpetrators are not caught, continue to believe they will not
get caught, and continue to perpetrate. Because survivors largely do not
report due to the documented disbelief and/or hostile reactions of others,
particularly those in authority, the first step of campus communities and
society as a whole should be to change these attitudes and the
procedures in order to encourage victims to come forward. If the cycle
is to be broken and the violence is to be ended, survivors need to report.
Yet survivors cannot be expected to report unless they are treated better
when they do. Despite universities' behavior, the structure of school
liability that the law sets up appears to recognize and support this
approach.
When schools create better responses to victim reporting, however,
and survivors begin to report the violence as a result, a strange thing
happens: the campus suddenly looks like it has a serious crime problem.
In fact, both national and local statistics 61 indicate that every campus
currently has this serious crime problem at a similar rate-a rate that
tracks the national incidence. The non-reporting phenomenon and how
it is created, however, means that the schools that ignore the problem
have fewer reports and look more safe, whereas the schools that
encourage victim reporting have more reports and look less safe.
Appearances in this case are completely the opposite of reality, and the
correct conclusion to draw from the number of reports of peer sexual
violence on a campus is entirely counterintuitive.
despite [his] criminal record[] and propensity to commit sexual misconduct against females who
would be exposed to [his] presence.

. .

. That the school[] . . . did nothing to ameliorate the risk

that a privileged male athlete with a history of sexual predation would present to female students
was a key factor in the appellate court's opinion . . . .").
61. Some schools conduct surveys on the incidence of sexual violence on their particular
campus. For example, the American College Health Association offers the American College
Health Assessment, which includes questions related to sexual violence. About ACHA-NCHA,
AM. COLL. HEALTH ASS'N-NAT'L COLL. HEALTH ASSESSMENT, http://www.acha-ncha.org/

overview.html (last visited Aug. 26, 2011). However, the school-specific information collected
by the surveys is generally not made publicly available. Nevertheless, aggregate data made
available to the public and school-specific survey results shared confidentially by officials at
some schools confirm a consistent incidence rate at individual campuses, subsets of campuses,
and nation-wide. Publications and Reports, AM. COLL. HEALTH ASS'N-NAT'L COLL. HEALTH

ASSESSMENT II, http://www.acha-ncha.org/reportsACHA-NCHAII.html (last visited Aug. 26,
2011).
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This disconnect between appearance and reality puts any given
college or university on the horns of a dilemma: does an institution seek
to end the violence by encouraging victim reporting and otherwise
drawing attention to the problem (through, for instance, mandatory
prevention-oriented programming at first-year student orientation) and
risk gaining a reputation as a dangerous campus, or does the institution
ignore the problem and discourage victim reporting either passively
(through hard-to-navigate, confusing, or simply nonexistent policies and
procedures) or actively (by treating victims who report hostilely) and
appear to be a less dangerous institution? Add into the mix that the
campus next door or across town or one step below or above in the
rankings may choose to ignore the problem, leaving a school to explain
to potential and current students and their parents why it has so much
more crime than a competitor institution. It is this information problem
that creates incentives counter to those created by the liability structure
of laws such as Title IX and the Clery Act. Instead of acknowledging
the problem, helping victims, and punishing perpetrators, schools have
incentives not only to remain unaware of the general problem and
specific instances of campus peer sexual violence, but also to actively
avoid knowledge about both.
Closely related to this information problem is one that underlies it.
Society continues to hold onto many persistent myths about sexual
violence. One such myth is that of the stranger rapist. In the public
imagination, a rapist is still someone who jumps a woman in a dark
alley late at night-someone she has never seen before and may never
see again, depending on whether he is caught.62 Yet in reality, the vast
majority of sexual violence perpetrators are those who are known to the
victims: acquaintances, dates, friends, husbands, family members,
religious officials, employers, supervisors, and others, 63 none of whom
need to jump a woman in a dark alley. Instead, they have access to her
home, her room, or her workplace. They are around her when she is
most vulnerable and when the least amount of force, if any at all, is
needed to overcome her will and lack of consent. After the violence,
she is left with all of the complicated decisions about whether to bring
charges and seek justice against someone whom she trusted and perhaps
even loved, and who may still be trusted and loved by others very close
to her.
This reality is a much more complicated picture than the strangerrape myth, and it is just as true on college and university campuses as in
62.
63.

SAMPSON, supra note 8, at 9.
The Offenders, RAPE, ABUSE & INCEST NAT'L NETWORK http://www.rainn.org/get-

information/ statistics/sexual-assault-offenders (last visited Aug. 26, 2011).
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any other place. In fact, the situation may be even more complicated on
campuses. Sociologists and criminologists studying campus peer sexual
violence have used a theory called the Routine Activities Theory to
posit that sexual violence occurs so frequently on college campuses
because there is a surfeit of "motivated offender[s] [and] . . . suitable

target[s] and an absence of capable guardians all converg[ing] in one
time and space." 64 They suggest that all three elements must be present
for there to be a significant crime problem and that the failure of schools
to act as "capable guardians" 65 elevates the influence of peer support to
commit assaults by "motivated offenders." 66 In other words, cultures
supportive of sexual violence can lead to higher incidences of sexual
violence. Additionally, if the institution itself ignores the problem and
fails to act as a "capable guardian," it too helps to create the problem.
Therefore, colleges and universities that want to be "capable guardians"
and address the campus peer sexual violence problem are left with
having not only to explain why increased reports of sexual violence are
a good thing, but also why the vast majority of campus sexual violence
cannot be addressed through better lighting, blue light phones, and
police escort services. Complicated pictures and persistent myths are
particularly hard to explain in our sound bite society.
There are still other less central, but also important, information
problems exacerbating schools' tendencies toward passive lack of, and
First, the vast majority of
active avoidance of, knowledge.
professionals working on the front lines in residence life, student

64. Amy I. Cass, Routine Activities and Sexual Assault: An Analysis of Individual- and
School-Level Factors,22 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 350, 351 (2007).
65. See Schwartz et al., supra note 24, at 630 (explaining that the occurrences of sexual
assault may be determined by the presence or absence of capable guardians and that college
campuses are frequently "effective-guardian-absent," such that the campuses lack administrators
who will seriously punish offenders); see also Elizabeth Ehrhardt Mustaine & Richard
Tewksbury, Sexual Assault of College Women: A Feminist Interpretation of a Routine Activities

Analysis, 27 CRIM. JUST. REV. 89, 101 (2002) ("[G]iven the lower penalties that men experience
for sexually assaulting women, any guardianship or deterrence that the criminal justice system
would provide is diminished."). Schwartz and his colleagues provide an explanation for the
history and use of the routine activities theory in explanations of criminal violence generally and
sexual violence on college campuses specifically. The original theory apparently focused almost
entirely on the victims "suitable targets" and has been criticized for seeking to "deflect[] attention
away from offenders' motivation." Schwartz et al., supra note 24, at 625. Schwartz and various
colleagues have therefore deliberately focused on the "motivated offender" part of the equation,
proposing a feminist version of the routine activities theory. Id. at 628. In addition, while they
note that the "absence of capable guardians" aspect of the theory's equation is the least studied,
they highlight the effect that a rape-supportive culture has on all three parts of the equation, in
that it "gives men some of the social support they need . . . to victimize women" while women's
"internalization of [the same] social structure can contribute both to the availability of 'suitable
targets' and to the lack of deterrence structures to act as effective guardianship." Id. at 630.
66. Schwartz et al., supra note 24, at 646.
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conduct, public safety, and other departments where survivors are likely
to report are not hired for, or trained in, knowledge about campus peer
sexual violence-nor are they lawyers. Many are honestly unaware of
the basic facts of campus peer sexual violence, never mind what the law
requires of schools and school officials, 67 yet they are the ones creating
and applying the policies and procedures, as well as responding to any
reports that victims do make on campus. Moreover, many are likely to
realize that they are untrained when they are confronted with the
problem and, especially if there is no time or resources with which to
educate themselves, may be tempted to ignore the problem or make it
go away.
Second, education and efforts to combat violence against women are
both notoriously underfunded areas. Thus, schools often find that
comprehensive training is too expensive for the wide swath of personnel
who could have contact with a campus peer sexual violence survivor.
This is particularly true when there are so many other important matters
vying for limited resources. Responding at all, never mind adequately,
to even a single report of peer sexual violence can also require a
tremendous amount of resources and is, by its nature, going to result in
67. Note that this characterization is made based on a variety of factors. First, from my years
of experience working in various parts of university administration, as well as my interactions
with higher education professionals when I attend and present at various national higher
education conferences, I have a sense of the typical background and training of most college
personnel. This rarely includes education as a lawyer or a background in the dynamics of sexual
violence. Second, an essay by the American College Personnel Association, a major student
affairs professional association, makes fairly clear that most student affairs personnel are not
lawyers. Patrick Love, Consideringa Career in Student Affairs, AM. COLL. PERSONNEL ASS'N

(Sept. 2003), http://www2.myacpa.org/conm/profprep/directory/career.php. Third, a 2002 study
on college and university responses to campus peer sexual violence found that, although most
school administrators viewed campus law enforcement as the likeliest staff to take sexual
violence reports, less than 38% required those staff to be trained in responding to sexual violence.
HEATHER M. KARJANE ET AL., CAMPUS SEXUAL ASSAULT: How AMERICA'S INSTITUTIONS OF

HIGHER EDUCATION RESPOND REPORT 67 (2002), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/

nij/grants/196676.pdf. Nearly 50% of schools provided no training on sexual violence to faculty
and staff generally. Id at 66. Finally, a recent Dear Colleague Letter from OCR, as well as the
most recent announcement of its campus grants program by the U.S. Department of Justice's
Office on Violence against Women, emphasizes training for school officials, indicating that there
is a need for training on sexual violence issues. Dear Colleague Letter, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC.
OFFICE FOR CIv. RIGHTS (Apr. 4, 2011), http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/
colleague-201104.pdf [hereinafter Dear Colleague Letter]; U.S. DEP'T OF JUST. OFFICE ON
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, OVW FISCAL YEAR 2011 GRANTS TO REDUCE SEXUAL ASSAULT,
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, DATING VIOLENCE, AND STALKING ON CAMPUS PROGRAM 9, 11, 12, 15,

16 (2011), available at http://www.ovw.usdoj.gov/docs/fy20l -campus-solicitation.pdf
[hereinafter OVW FISCAL YEAR 2011 GRANTS] (explaining that the funds issued under the
Campus Program may be used to create and improve training programs for "campus
administrators, security personnel, and personnel serving on campus disciplinary boards" on state
and federal policies, protocols, and services regarding sexual assault, domestic violence, dating
violence, and stalking).
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at least one very unhappy student. That student may be unhappy
enough to sue or complain to the DOE, an even greater resource drain.
Under these circumstances, not knowing about the violence to begin
with, or making a report go away as soon as possible, once again looks
like a very attractive option.
In sum, over thirty years of research demonstrates that campus peer
sexual violence is a shockingly common phenomenon that is surrounded
by a general lack of knowledge of the problem as a whole, of specific
instances of violence, and of the law that applies to both. In addition,
this research has made clear that the high incidence of violence is
largely due to repeat perpetration by assailants who believe they will not
be caught or are actually not caught. Because catching assailants
requires victims to report, ending the violence requires facilitating and
increasing victim reporting.
Furthermore, the seeming conflict between a high incidence of
violence and a general lack of awareness of the violence is caused by
three levels of "information problems" relating to the violence and
schools' institutional responses to it. At the first and most surface level
is the massive underreporting of the violence by victims, which leads to
general silence and lack of awareness surrounding the violence itself.
At a second and deeper level, survivors' fears regarding the hostile
treatment they will face if they report the violence cause many survivors
not to come forward, and these fears appear to be justified by many
schools' actual institutional responses when survivors do report.
Finally, at the third and deepest level, schools' poor institutional
responses are themselves caused by four additional information-related
difficulties: (1) the counter-intuitive effects of increased reporting on a
school's public image; (2) the persistence of the stranger-rape myth
among students, parents, and school officials; (3) the lack of education
and training about campus peer sexual violence or the law that applies
to it among the front-line school officials who respond to individual
cases; and (4) the prohibitively expensive broad-based education and
training that correcting such information problems would require.
All in all, these three levels of information problems cause a lack of
awareness on the part of school officials, students, and their parents
about campus peer sexual violence and the legal requirements that
schools must meet in addressing it. Furthermore, these problems
provide incentives to schools to actively avoid such knowledge. When
greater victim reporting presents a public image and resource problem,
deliberately or passively discouraging knowledge of the violence makes
it easier to maintain an illusion, both internally and externally, that the
violence is not occurring or is less common than it actually is.
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III. THE ROLE OF THE LAW AND LEGAL ENFORCEMENT INPERPETUATING
AND EXACERBATING CAMPUS PEER SEXUAL VIOLENCE INFORMATION
PROBLEMS
At first glance,

intractable.

these information

problems seem somewhat

This is particularly the case for the central dilemma

discussed above: ending the violence and creating a safer campus
requires more victims to come forward, but encouraging reporting
makes a campus look less safe. Higher education in the United States is

a competitive business, and those institutions competing for students are
overwhelmingly private entities. Even publicly-funded state schools
still compete for the best students, tuition dollars, and future alumni
donations. A school's reputation is critically important in such a
competitive system. Although factors such as academic reputation,
curriculum, and cost likely count as the most important criteria for most
students and parents, 68 a reputation as a dangerous place-especially as
a place where a large number of daughters and young women are
victims of rape-must be damaging to a school.
Indeed, the idea that potential students and parents should know
about the level of crime-especially violent crime--on a campus was a
key motivator behind the Clery Act. 69 A primary aim of the Clery Act
involves campus crime reporting, establishing requirements for schools

to report and publish certain categories of crime that occur on campus.
The DOE may fine schools that violate the Clery Act, with the largest
fine to date being the aforementioned $350,000 against Eastern
Michigan University. 70 This case and other cases involving large fines
against schools for Clery Act violations demonstrate that, as sexual
violence is the most common form of violent crime on college

campuses today, 71 the Clery Act and the issue of campus peer sexual
violence have become quite interrelated.
However, of the federal statutes that apply to campus peer sexual

violence, the Clery Act is arguably not the most important, especially

68. The studies that have sought to measure the Clery Act's achievement of the Clerys'
original goals, including students' selection of schools based on safety issues, have found overall
that students and parents overwhelmingly do not consult Clery Act statistics and/or do not use
those statistics in choosing schools. Dennis E. Gregory & Steven M. Janosik, Research on the
Clery Act and Its Impact on Higher Education Administrative Practice, in CAMPUS CRIME:
LEGAL, SOCIAL AND POLICY PERSPECTIVES 30, 60 (Bonnie S. Fisher & John J. Sloan, III eds., 2d

ed. 2007).
69. H.R. REP. No. Hl 1499-01, at 1 (1990) (Conf. Rep.) (statement of Rep. Gooding).
70. See Larcom, supra note 56 ("Eastern Michigan University will have to pay $350,000 in
fines for violating a federal campus crime reporting law-the largest ever imposed by the U.S.
Department of Education for Clery Act violations.").
71. SAMPSON, supra note 8, at 1.
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with regard to protecting victims of campus peer sexual violence. That
honor instead belongs to Title IX, which prohibits sexual harassment in
schools as a form of sex discrimination. 72 Peer sexual violence is
generally considered a case of hostile environment sexual harassment
that is "so severe, pervasive and objectively offensive that it effectively
bars the victim's access to an educational opportunity or benefit." 73
Because of the severity of sexual violence generally, even a single
instance of violence will be considered hostile environment sexual
harassment.74
Title IX is enforced in two ways when peer sexual violence is at
issue: first, through survivors' private right of action against their
schools, 75 and second, through administrative enforcement by the
Both enforcement
DOE's Office for Civil Rights ("OCR",).7 6
jurisdictions derive from the fact that schools agree to comply with Title
IX in order to receive federal funds.77
In general, the private right of action requires a plaintiff/survivor to
reach the quite high standard set out by two Supreme Court cases,
Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School Districtand Davis v. Monroe
County Board of Education, which will be discussed in more detail

below. If a plaintiff can meet that standard, as suggested above, the
required damages that the school might have to pay are quite
72. See U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, REVISED SEXUAL HARASSMENT
GUIDANCE: HARASSMENT OF STUDENT BY SCHOOL EMPLOYEES, OTHER STUDENTS, OR THIRD

PARTIES 2 (2001) [hereinafter REVISED GUIDANCE], available at http://www.ed.gov/offices/

OCR/archives/pdf/shguide.pdf ("[S]exual harassment of students can constitute discrimination
prohibited by Title IX.").
73. See Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 632-33 (1999) (holding that "a
private damages action may lie against the school board in cases of student-on-student harassment
... only where the funding recipient acts with deliberate indifference to known acts of harassment
in its programs or activities. . . . [S]uch an action will lie only for harassment that is so severe,
pervasive, and objectively offensive that it effectively bars the victim's access to an educational
opportunity or benefit.").
74. See REVISED GUIDANCE, supra note 72, at 6 ("The more severe the conduct, the less the

need to show a repetitive series of incidents; this is particularly true if the harassment is physical.
For instance, if the conduct is more severe, e.g., attempts to grab a female student's breasts or
attempts to grab any student's genital area or buttocks, it need not be as persistent to create a
hostile environment. Indeed, a single or isolated incident of sexual harassment may, if
sufficiently severe, create a hostile environment.").
75. THE EDUCATOR'S GUIDE TO CONTROLLING SEXUAL HARASSMENT T 102 (Travis Hicks
ed., 2008) [hereinafter EDUCATOR'S GUIDE].
76. Id. 321.
77. See REVISED GUIDANCE, supra note 72, at 2-3 ("Title IX applies to all public and private

educational institutions that receive Federal funds, i.e., recipients, including, but not limited to
elementary and secondary schools, school districts, propriety schools, colleges, and universities. .
. . As a condition of receiving funds from the Department, a school is required to comply with
Title IX and the Department's Title IX regulations, which spell out prohibitions against sex
discrimination.").
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significant. 78 While most cases settle, the settlements give a sense of
both sides' anticipated damages awarded by a jury.
The OCR process is more injunctive than compensatory, so student
victims complaining to OCR will not get monetary damages. However,
OCR's approach is both more comprehensive and more exacting than is
possible in a private lawsuit, especially under the Gebser/Davis
standard. Schools can be, and often are, required to change their entire
response system to peer sexual violence and harassment, including, but
not limited to, policies, procedures, and resource allocations.
As one can see, particularly from cases like those at Eastern
Michigan University and University of Colorado, Title IX and the Clery
Act, never mind the state laws that may apply in any given case, set up a
formidable liability scheme where noncompliance can be quite
expensive for schools. Yet damage to a school's reputation could be
even more expensive, although in a less quantifiable way. Nevertheless,
the legislative and administrative schemes under Title IX and the Clery
Act fail to address the countervailing pressures created by the concern
about public image and reputation, although for different reasons. Title
IX and its attendant enforcement regimes appear not to recognize the
issue of reputation at all. Moreover, while the Clery Act is very
concerned with increasing information flow and transparency about
campus crime, 79 as will be discussed in greater detail below, its
approach is not one that is well-suited to the counterintuitive effects of
reporting in the campus peer sexual violence context or to debunking
the stranger-rape myth.80 Therefore, neither Title IX nor the Clery Act
addresses the counterincentives created by the information problems
discussed above. 8 1 In fact, there are several ways in which they
exacerbate those problems.
78. See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text (explaining that Eastern Michigan
University was fined $350,000 for violations of the Clery Act after a female student was raped
and murdered by a fellow student and that Arizona State University settled for $850,000 paid to
the victim and the creation of a program for women's safety after a lawsuit was filed by a former
student, where the student alleged that the university placed her in a "dangerous situation" that
resulted in her rape).
79. See infra note 69 and accompanying text (discussing the purpose and intent of the Clery
Act).
80. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text (explaining that the schools are provided
with the incentive to stay unaware of, and to actively avoid knowledge of, the general problem of
sexual violence and the specific occurrences of campus peer sexual violence, as schools face the
threat of gaining a negative reputation if they draw attention to campus sexual violence).
81. See supra notes 50-58 and accompanying text (explaining that Title IX and the Clery
Act's focus on information flow and transparency does not effectively combat schools' incentives
to stay unaware of, and avoid knowledge of, the problem and occurrences of sexual violence on
campuses, as schools fear that they will gain a negative reputation from the publication of this
information).
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A. Court Enforcement of Title LY and the Actual Knowledge Test
The first way in which Title IX exacerbates the information problems
and encourages both passive unawareness and active avoidance of
knowledge is through the test for school liability for peer sexual
harassment, including sexual violence. Title IX's private right of
action, as well as the standard that a survivor must reach in order to
prove that her Title IX rights were violated, is derived from the Gebser
and Davis cases. The test has been developed in peer sexual violence
cases since Davis by lower courts applying the Davis precedent and can
be summarized generally as:
(1) the school is a recipient of federal funding; 82
(2) the sexual harassment was so severe, pervasive, and objectively
offensive that it could be said to deprive the plaintiff of access to
the educational opportunities or benefits provided by the school; 83
(3) the school had actual knowledge/notice of the harassment; 84 and
(4) the school was deliberately indifferent to the harassment. 85
A look at the full corpus of cases shows that many cases never make
it to the fourth prong of the test. 8 6 This is because many are thrown out
as a result of the third prong, which requires a plaintiff to show that the
school had actual knowledge or notice of the harassment.
Others have written on this problem, including several dissenting
Supreme Court Justices in Gebser and Davis. This subsection will
briefly summarize their analyses and update them based on what has
actually occurred since the late 1990s. Two main difficulties have
emerged from the case law, and a third difficulty occurs as a result of
pure logic as well as actual experience.
First, the actual knowledge prong requires that the school have actual
knowledge of the harassment, begging the question of who represents
the school. There is significant variation on this question. In some
cases, especially ones where the harasser is a teacher or school official,
82. S.S. v. Alexander, 177 P.3d 724, 736 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008) (citing Vance v. Spencer
Cnty. Pub. Sch. Dist., 231 F.3d 253, 258-59 (6th Cir. 2000)).
83. Id.; see also Vance v. Spencer Cnty Pub. Sch. Dist., 231 F.3d 253, 258-59 (6th Cir. 2000)
("In Davis, the Supreme Court established that Title IX may support a claim for student-onstudent sexual harassment when the plaintiff can demonstrate . . . [that] the sexual harassment
was so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it could be said to deprive the plaintiff of
access to the educational opportunities or benefits provided by the school ..... (citing Soper v.
Hoben, 195 F.3d 845, 854 (6th Cir. 1999))).
84. Soper v. Hoben, 195 F.3d 845, 854 (6th Cir. 1999) (citing Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of
Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 631-32 (1999)).
85. Id.
86. The precedent that has developed under the fourth "deliberate indifference" prong was the
focus of my 2009 article, where my overall conclusion was that it was as robust as a deliberate
indifference standard can be. See generally Cantalupo,supra note 2.
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if only another teacher or school official of equal rank has knowledge of
the harassment, courts have found this knowledge to be insufficient to
qualify as knowledge by the school.8 7 Courts are more open to allowing
teachers to count as the school in peer sexual harassment cases,88 but
this is not guaranteed.8 9 Others who would seem to be in similar
positions of authority as teachers, such as bus drivers, 90 coaches,91 and
school "paraprofessionals," 92 have been judged to be "inappropriate
persons." This leads to confusing variation, 9 3 requiring survivors to
know and parse through school hierarchies in specific and diverse
contexts based on the identities of the perpetrators and the relationships
between the person with knowledge and the harasser.
Second, variation has emerged as to what kind of knowledge
constitutes actual knowledge. If a school is aware of a student harassing
other students aside from the victim who is reporting in a given case,
must the school have actual knowledge of the harassment experienced
by that particular victim? Courts have resolved this issue in different
ways. 94 In a review of peer harassment cases that pose this question,
87. Megan Ryan ed., Commentary, Comments from the Spring 2007 HarvardJournalof Law
& Gender Conference Held at HarvardLaw School, 31 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 378, 387 (2008)

(quoting Linda Wharton).
88. Montgomery v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 709, 109 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1099 (D. Minn. 2000);
Morlock v. W. Cent. Educ. Dist., 46 F. Supp. 2d 892, 908 (D. Minn. 1999); Soriano ex rel. Garcia
v. Bd. of Educ. of N.Y.C., No. 01 CV 491(JG), 2004 WL 2397610, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 27,
2004); Jones v. Ind. Area Sch. Dist., 397 F. Supp. 2d 628, 644 (W.D. Pa. 2005).
89. See M. v. Stamford Bd. of Educ., No. 3:05-vc-0177, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51933, at
*25-26 (D. Conn. July 7, 2008) (holding that actual knowledge did not exist until assistant
principal was informed, even though other school officials were previously aware of the incident),
vacated in part by M. v. Stamford Bd. of Educ., No. 3:05-cv-0177, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51933
(D. Conn. Sept. 9, 2008); Peer ex rel. Jane Doe v. Porterfield, No. 1:05-cv-769, 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 1380, at *28-30 (W.D. Mich. Jan. 8, 2007) (stating notice must be to an "official ...
capable of terminating or suspending the individual" as held to apply to a principal but not
necessarily teachers (quoting Nelson v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 356, No. 00-2079, 2002 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 3093, at *15 (D. Minn. Feb. 15, 2002))).
90. Stachling v. Metro. Gov't, No. 3:07-0797, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91519, at *30--31 (M.D.
Tenn. Sept. 12, 2008).
91. See Halvorson v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 1-007, No. CIV-07-1363-M, 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 96445, at *6 (W.D. Okla. Nov. 26, 2008) (explaining that the coaches "did not have
authority to institute measures on the District's behalf"). But see Roe ex rel. Callahan v. Gustine
Unified Sch. Dist., 678 F. Supp. 2d 1008, 1033-34 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (finding that "case law does
not expressly limit the employee who may trigger a school district's liability under Title IX; it is
an 'open question.' . . . [D]eciding who exercises substantial control for the purposes of Title IX
liability is necessarily a fact-based inquiry.... On the present record and without evidence from
the District, it cannot be established as a matter of law that [the coach] was not an 'appropriate
person' for purposes of Title IX.").
92. Noble v. Branch Intermediate Sch. Dist., No. 4:01cv 58, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19600, at
*44-48 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 9, 2002).
93. Ryan, supra note 87, at 388.
94. Id. at 388-89.
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the decisions are fairly evenly split between courts that find that the
school must have actual knowledge of the harassment experienced by
the particular survivor bringing the case, courts that find that the
school's knowledge of the peer harasser's previous harassment of other
victims is sufficient to meet the actual knowledge standard, and
ambiguous decisions. 95 While the circuit court cases are all in the
95. Of seventeen cases where this question was dealt with directly or indirectly, six resulted in
the court not requiring actual knowledge of harassment involving a specific victim. See Williams
v. Bd. of Regents, 477 F.3d 1282, 1289 (11th Cir. 2007) (implying that knowledge of the
perpetrator's previous harassment was enough to put the school on notice); Roe ex rel. Callahan,
678 F. Supp. 2d at 1029-34 (noting that the harassing behavior does not have to be plaintiff
specific); Lopez v. Metro. Gov't, 646 F. Supp. 2d 891, 915-16 (M.D. Tenn. 2009) (concluding
that knowledge of the perpetrator's sexual proclivities and previous misbehavior put the school
on notice even though no prior incidents occurred between the perpetrator and victim); Staehling
v. Metro. Gov't, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91519, at *28-31 ("The institution must have possessed
enough knowledge of the harassment that it could reasonably have responded with remedial
measures to address the kind of harassment upon which plaintiffs legal claim is based."); J.K. v.
Ariz. Bd. of Regents, No. CV 06-916-PHX-MHM, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83855, at *45-46 (D.
Ariz. Sept. 29, 2008) ("Title IX claims can be based on recipients knowledge of, and deliberate
indifference to, a particular harasser's conduct in general."); Michelle M. v. Dunsmuir Joint
Union Sch. Dist., No. 2:04-cv-2411 -MCE-PAN, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77328, at *16, *20 (E.D.
Cal. Oct. 12, 2006) (finding that although the defendants may not have had actual knowledge of
specific incidents of peer sexual harassment, the defendant's knowledge of the perpetrator's prior
disturbing behavior, coupled with the defendant's failure to disseminate its policies on sexual
harassment, could give rise to Title IX liability). Five cases resulted in the court finding that the
actual knowledge prong had not been met because the school did not have knowledge of
harassment directed at the victim bringing the case. See Peer ex rel. Jane Doe v. Porterfield, 2007
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1380, at *28-30 (noting that knowledge of student's disciplinary problems did
not amount to knowledge that he posed a sexual threat to other students); Ross v. Corp. of Mercer
Univ., 506 F. Supp. 2d 1325, 1348 (M.D. Ga. 2007) ("While the precise boundaries of what kind
of 'actual knowledge' a school must have to subject itself to Title IX liability remain undefined, it
is generally accepted that the knowledge must encompass either actual notice of the precise
instance of abuse that gave rise to the case at hand or actual knowledge of at least a significant
risk of sexual abuse."); Soriano ex rel. Garcia v. Bd. of Educ. of N.Y.C., 2004 WL 2397610, at *4
(finding that while a general lack of discipline in the school and a student's reputation for
inappropriate sexual conduct were not enough to put the school on actual notice, the plaintiffs
complaint to a teacher did put the school on actual notice); Noble, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19600,
at *39-47 (holding that knowledge of the perpetrator's past disciplinary problems was not enough
to put the school on actual notice); K.F. v. River Bend Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No. 2, No. 01 C
50005, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12468, at *3-6 (N.D. Ill. July 8, 2002) (noting that perpetrator's
history of general disciplinary problems was not enough to put the school on actual notice).
Another six cases were ambiguous on this point. See Simpson v. Univ. of Colo. Boulder, 500
F.3d 1170, 1177 (10th Cir. 2007) ("Gebser rejected a negligence standard for liability-namely, a
standard that would have imposed liability on a school district for 'failure to react to teacherstudent harassment of which it .

.

. should have known'-but instead had 'concluded that the

district could be liable for damages only where the district itself intentionally acted in clear
violation of Title IX by remaining deliberately indifferent to acts of teacher-student harassment of
which it had actual knowledge."); Winzer v. Sch. Dist. for City of Pontiac, 105 F. App'x. 679,
681 (6th Cir. 2004) ("The Supreme Court did not decide in Davis whether the 'known acts of
student-on-student sexual harassment' must have been directed against the plaintiff herself.
Neither did it decide whether such acts must have been committed by the plaintiffs harasser, as
opposed to some other student."); Murrell v. Denver Pub. Sch., 186 F.3d 1238, 1247 (10th Cir.
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second and third categories (no knowledge of specific victim required
or ambiguous), few cases are appealed beyond the district court level.
This review shows that the district courts' decisions demonstrate
considerable variation on this issue.
The number of district courts that insist upon actual knowledge of
harassment of a specific victim is doubly surprising because it suggests
a certain acceptance of victim-blaming attitudes by some courts. A
belief that the identity of the victim of harassing behavior is relevant to
whether the school is obligated to respond to the harassment focuses the
school or the court on the victim's, and not the perpetrator's, behavior,
suggesting that some victims must do something that invites the
harassment, whereas other victims are "blameless."
Indeed, if a
perpetrator is known to have harassed or assaulted multiple victims, this
should suggest that the victim's identity and behavior are not relevant
because the perpetrator himself does not find the identity of the victim
relevant.
The Simpson case involving the University of Colorado provides a
more specific example of the range of court reasoning on this issue. In
that case, the Tenth Circuit denied the university's summary judgment
motion on the basis that the university "sanctioned, supported, even
funded" 96 a football recruiting program where the risk of peer sexual
violence occurring was so obvious that the school's failure to address it
constituted deliberate indifference. 97 In denying the university's motion
for summary judgment, the court found that the football coach
"maintained an unsupervised player-host program to show high-school
recruits 'a good time"' despite knowing generally "of the serious risk of

1999) ("[T]he first two prongs of the Davis analysis require that a school official who possessed
the requisite control over the situation had actual knowledge of, and was deliberately indifferent
to, the alleged harassment."); Doe v. N. Allegheny Sch. Dist., No. 2:08cvl383, 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 89397, at *15-18 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 28, 2009) ("An educational institution has 'actual
knowledge' [or 'actual notice'] if it knows the underlying facts, indicating sufficiently substantial
danger to students, and was therefore aware of the danger. . . . The Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit has clarified that actual notice cannot be based upon a mere possibility. . . . The
Seventh Circuit has found actual knowledge where there are risks of harassment 'so greatly that
they are almost certain to materialize if nothing is done . . ."); Doe v. Ohio State Univ. Bd. of
Regents, No. 2:04-CV-0307, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70444, at *31-34 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 28, 2006)
("The Supreme Court has declined to apply a constructive-knowledge standard, demanding actual
knowledge of sexual harassment in Title IX cases of teacher-on-student harassment .

. .

. The

Supreme Court has unequivocally imported the actual-knowledge standard into cases of studenton-student harassment.... The Sixth Circuit has followed the Supreme Court's lead in requiring
actual knowledge of student-on-student sexual harassment in Title IX cases."); Vaird v. Sch. Dist.
of Phila., No. 99-2727, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6492, at *11-12 (E.D. Pa. May 12, 2000)
("[A]ctual notice requires more than a simple report of inappropriate conduct by a teacher.").
96. Simpson, 500 F.3d at 1177.
97. Id at 1185.
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sexual harassment and assault during college-football recruiting efforts;
. . . that such assaults had indeed occurred during CU recruiting visits; .
. . [and] that there had been no change in atmosphere since [the last

assault].""
The district court that decided the case, however, found that the
actual knowledge standard had not been met. In doing so, the court
indicated that three to seven prior incidents of sexual harassment and
assault proved that "some players, and some recruits, had engaged in
sexual harassment and sexual assault" but not that they put the
university "on notice of a risk that CU football players and recruits
would sexually assault female University students as part of the
recruiting program, including the risk that those assaults would be aided
or exacerbated by excessive alcohol use by players, recruits, and female
students." 99 Thus, the district court in Simpson seemed to imply that the
actual knowledge requirement was not met until the school was able to
predict with clairvoyant accuracy that exactly what did happen in the
case would happen.
The Tenth Circuit's decision in Simpson and the decisions in J.K v.
Arizona Board of Regents involving Arizona State Universityloo and
Williams v. Board of Regents involving the University of Georgialol

provide some hope for the future that actual knowledge will be defined
by courts in a broader sense. There is still significant variation among
courts, however, and the idea that even facts as egregious as those in
Simpson could be seen as being insufficient to establish actual
knowledge by the district court means that there is still a good chance
that schools with knowledge of a serious sexual violence problem
among their students will not be held liable. Given what is known
about the factors that contribute to the incidence of campus peer sexual
violence, especially the role that male peer support can play in
encouraging some male students who may not otherwise have become
offenders to perpetrate sexual violence,102 the concept of "actual
knowledge" used by the Tenth Circuit in Simpson is much closer to
reality than that used by the Simpson district court. That is, research
shows that campus cultures that are supportive of sexual violence
contribute to individual cases of peer sexual violence, 103 and the law
98. Id. at 1184.

99. Simpson v. Univ. of Colo. Boulder, 372 F. Supp. 2d 1229, 1237 (D. Colo. 2005), rev'd
and remanded sub. nom., 500 F.3d 1170 (10th Cir. 2007).

100. J.K. v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83855 (D. Ariz. 2008).
101. Williams v. Bd. of Regents, 477 F.3d 1282 (llth Cir. 2007).
102. Schwartz et al., supra note 24, at 641.
103. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text (stating that college campuses often lack
"effective-guardians," as men who inflict sexual abuse on women are not seriously punished for
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should therefore create incentives for schools to both understand this
insight and act upon it. At best, the current confusion over what
constitutes actual knowledge does not send this clear message, and at
worst, it creates incentives in exactly the opposite direction.
This brings the discussion to the final problem with the actual
knowledge standard. The standard that the Gebser court created, but
did not define, was not the only possible standard. In fact, the plaintiff,
many amici, and the DOE either advocated, or actually used, a
constructive knowledge standard, which asks whether the defendant
knew, or reasonably should have known, that a risk of harassment
existed. 104 Such a standard creates incentives for schools to set up
mechanisms likely to flush out and address harassment, since there is a
substantial risk that a court will decide that the school "should have
known" about the harassment anyway. In addition, the rule adopted by
the Supreme Court in the sexual harassment in employment cases,
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton10 5 and Burlington Industries, Inc. v.

Ellerth,106 caused many employers to adopt sexual harassment policies
Employers did so because under the
and procedures. 107
Faragher/Ellerthstandard, if they have such policies and procedures in
place, but a plaintiff fails to use them, the employer has a defense
against liability for the harassment.108
These are not the incentives created by the actual knowledge
standard. Rather, the actual knowledge standard, as Justice Stevens
noted in his dissent in Gebser, encourages schools to avoid knowledge
rather than set up procedures by which survivors can easily report.109
After all, if schools can avoid knowledge then they need not respond,
and a court will not evaluate whether they acted with deliberate
indifference. Justice Stevens's dissent was in part a response to the

their acts, and noting that data regarding male peer support for the victimization of women
demonstrates that male undergraduate students are encouraged by their sexually abusive male
peers to assault their girlfriends or dating partners).
104. Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 296 (1998) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); REVISED GUIDANCE, supra note 72, at 13.

105. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 780 (1998).
106. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765-66 (1998).
107. See Joanna L. Grossman, The Culture of Compliance: The Final Triumph of Form over
Substance in Sexual Harassment Law, 26 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 3, 4 (2003) ("The centerpiece of

the [Faragher/Ellerth] liability scheme is a rule of automatic liability for hostile environment
harassment by supervisors, softened by an affirmative defense that excuses employers from
liability or damages if they take adequate preventative and corrective measures. . . . Employers
have taken their [lawyers'] advice, by and large, adopting or updating procedures and training
programs and implementing internal grievance procedures.").
108. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764.
109. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 296 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Court's suggestion that the actual knowledge standard is designed to
"avoid diverting education funding from beneficial uses where a
[school] was unaware of discrimination in its programs and is willing to
institute prompt corrective measures."110 A decade plus of experience
with the actual knowledge standard demonstrates that Justice Stevens
was correct and that schools are not "willing to institute prompt
corrective measures." In fact, as already noted, doing nothing at all is
both the school's response of choice and the response that is most likely
to qualify as a violation of a different prong of the same review
standard. Unlike with the Faragher/Ellerthapproach, there has not
been a rush to develop policies, procedures, and training on sexual
harassment among schools as there has been among employers.
Experience now proves what common sense and Justice Stevens
suggested twelve years ago: the peer sexual violence problem will
persist until schools make sure that they have knowledge about what is
actually occurring among their students, and schools will not acquire
that knowledge until the law requires them to do so, or at least until the
law does not encourage them to do the opposite.
B. Problemswith Administrative Enforcement of Title LX

The good news is that OCR uses a constructive knowledge standard
when it investigates schools for violations of Title IX in peer sexual
harassment cases. The bad news is that very few people know how to
initiate an OCR investigation, and almost no one knows about the
results of those investigations. In addition, OCR's proactive guidance,
while more easily available to the general public, is relatively vague, if
improving. This particular information problem compromises the
effectiveness of OCR's school regulation quite broadly and contributes
to both passive unawareness and active avoidance of awareness on the
part of schools. Although the current administration is making
admirable efforts to change this situation by issuing a recent Dear
Colleague Letter ("DCL")11 1 and posting the results of recent

110. Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 289 (1998).
111. Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 67, at n. 1 ("The Department has determined that this
Dear Colleague Letter is a 'significant guidance document' under the Office of Management and
Budget's Final Bulletin for Agency Good Guidance Practices, 72 Fed. Reg. 3432 (Jan. 25, 2007),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/regulatorymatterspdf/
012507_good guidance.pdf. OCR issues this and other policy guidance to provide recipients
with information to assist them in meeting their obligations, and to provide members of the public
with information about their rights, under the civil rights laws and implementing regulations that
we enforce. OCR's legal authority is based on those laws and regulations. This letter does not
add requirements to applicable law, but provides information and examples to inform recipients
about how OCR evaluates whether covered entities are complying with their legal obligations.").
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investigations in OCR's electronic reading room, 112 these efforts are
limited in comparison to the scope of the problem.
OCR enforcement generally takes place when a complaint is filed
regarding a school's response to a sexual harassment case, which causes
OCR to undertake a fairly comprehensive investigation of that school's
response system.11 3 This investigation often includes a close review of
institutional policies and procedures, as well as the steps the school took
to resolve a complaint' 1 4 and files relating to past sexual harassment
cases that required a school to respond in some way.Its OCR also
interviews those involved in the case, including particularly relevant
school personnel.1 16 OCR investigations are generally resolved through
a "letter of finding" ("LOF") addressed to the school and written by
OCR, which is sometimes accompanied by a "commitment to resolve"
("CTR") signed by the school.1 17 Even when OCR does not find a
school in violation of Title LX or its regulations, OCR may find
"technical violations" in a school's policies or procedures and require a
school to make changes to those policies as directed by OCR.118 Once
a case is resolved, OCR takes no further action besides monitoring any
agreement it may have made with the school. 1 9

112. Reading Room (eFOIA Index), U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS (May 26,

2011), http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/publications.html.
113.

See REVISED GUIDANCE, supra note 72, at 14 (explaining that OCR may be asked to

"investigate or otherwise resolve incidents of sexual harassment of students, including incidents
caused by employees, other students, or third parties").
114. See id. (explaining that in OCR's investigation of incidents or sexual harassment, OCR
will consider whether "(1) the school has a disseminated policy prohibiting sex discrimination
under Title IX and the effect grievance procedures; (2) the school appropriately investigated or
otherwise responded to allegations of sexual harassment; and (3) the school has taken immediate
and effective corrective action responsive to the harassment, including effective actions to end the
harassment, prevent its recurrence, and as appropriate, remedy its effects.").
115. See OCR Complaint Processing Procedures, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC. OFFICE FOR CIVIL

RIGHTS (Jan. 8, 2010), http://www.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/complaints-how.html ("OCR may
use a variety of fact-finding techniques in its investigation of the complaint. These techniques
may include reviewing documentary evidence submitted by both parties, conducting interviews
with the complainant, recipient's personnel, and other witnesses and/or site visits.").
116. See id (explaining that OCR's fact-finding techniques in its investigation of a complaint
include interviews with the personnel of the complaint recipient).
117. See EDUCATOR'S GUIDE, supra note 75,

322 (explaining the complaint process in

campus sexual violence cases).
118. See, e.g., Letter from Linda Howard-Kurent, Supervisory Team Leader, Office for Civil
Rights, U.S. Dep't of Educ., to Norman Cohen, President, Utah Coll. of Massage Therapy (Aug.
17, 2001) (on file with author) (stating that the College would adopt and publish new procedures
under OCR authority without any admission of wrongdoing).
119. See REVISED GUIDANCE, supra note 72, at 14 (stating that once a case is considered

resolved, the OCR "will take no further action, other than monitoring compliance with an
agreement, if any, between the school and OCR").
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Relative to the Gebser/Davis standard, the comprehensiveness and
strictness of OCR's approach makes it potentially a very useful tool to
get schools to respond properly to peer sexual violence. In addition to
the use of the constructive knowledge standard, OCR's approach is
injunctive, forward-looking, and directly changes school behavior for
the future. On the other hand, a private suit for damages at best will
only make such changes indirectly, perhaps through a settlement where
the plaintiff insists on changes, or because the school learns its lesson
and makes changes to avoid a repeat violation. In addition, because of
their comprehensiveness, OCR's investigations look at a school's
system at a very detailed level and require changes at a similar level of
detail. In part because the deliberate indifference standard only reaches
the worst school behaviors but also because this is not the typical role of
courts, private lawsuits under Title IX are unlikely to reach the level of
detail that are regular parts of the OCR process.
This level of detailed review and guidance is much needed on the
ground at most schools. For the front-line educational administrators
and professionals actually dealing with cases of peer sexual violence,
the devil is often in the details. When one student sexually assaults
another student in the same dorm, which student should the school
move out of the dorm while the school is investigating the case? What
standard of proof should the student code of conduct adopt in
adjudications of such cases and can or should it be different from the
standard used for other conduct code violations (e.g., plagiarism)?
What is the scope of the school's obligations to protect the students'
confidentiality, especially when there is ambiguity and/or a potential
conflict in the regulations? Can a school issue a "stay-away order"
between students where an official charge under the student code of
conduct has not been filed? Can a school require, encourage, or allow
mediation of sexual harassment or violence cases? Should a survivor be
allowed to appeal a hearing board decision in a student conduct case? If
so, what access to evidence, the transcript of the hearing, and any
written basis of the judgment should she have? These are just some of
the questions that come up regularly for the "first responders" and
policymakers at schools.
These are also questions that do not show up in most Title IX
lawsuits or in OCR's 2001 Revised Guidance1 20 on how to respond to
peer sexual harassment and violence. Moreover, while the DCL has
made a good start at answering a number of these questions, it does not
answer them all, and the nature of individual cases is that new questions
120. See generally id. (explaining how certain issues may arise, such as the need for separate
housing arrangements, but lacking the specific questions typically dealt with by first responders).
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are sure to arise. Many of these issues, however, have been investigated
and resolved by OCR in its investigations. Therefore, having access to
OCR's LOFs could resolve many of these questions for the people who
really need such answers.
1. Lack of a Well-Publicized Complaint Procedure
Because they are a source of additional and often more specific
guidance to schools, OCR investigations in response to complaints that
a school mishandled a sexual violence case have the potential to be very
helpful to both survivors and campus policymakers and administrators.
Unfortunately, neither the information about the OCR complaint
procedure nor the results of OCR investigations are particularly wellpublicized or accessible to the general public. In the case of OCR
complaints, while information is posted on the OCR website,12 1 this is
the only place that it seems to appear. Even OCR's own guidance and
the recent DCL, while referring to OCR investigations, 122 never explain
how one would go about initiating an investigation or where one might
file a complaint. 123 While it is clear that the main audience for the
guidance is schools, the guidance is likely to be read by a wider swath
of the general public than just the regulated entities. In addition, at no
place on the OCR websites dealing with the complaint process is sexual
harassment mentioned, so these pages are not terribly easy to find
through simple Internet searching. The CPI's series on campus sexual
violence confirms that "few students know they have the right to
complain" and "the number
of investigations into sexual assault-related
1 24
cases is 'shockingly low."'
2. Violations of the Freedom of Information Act
Still, the two websites devoted to the OCR complaint process look
like a no-holds-barred publicity campaign compared to the publicly
121. See OCR Complaint Processing Procedures, supra note 115 (describing the criteria used
by OCR to evaluate a complaint and the procedures for challenging determinations of noncompliance); U.S. Dep't of Educ., How to File a Discrimination Complaint with the Office for

Civil Rights, ED.Gov, http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/howto.html?src=rt (last
modified Oct. 20, 2010) (describing the process to file a discrimination complaint with OCR).
122. See REVISED GUIDANCE, supra note 72, at i, iii, 5-6, 8, 10, 11, 14-15, 20-22 (explaining
the OCR complaint process); Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 111, at 9-12, 16 (stating how
criminal investigations should have no or limited effect upon the initiation and progress of a
school's internal Title IX investigation).
123. The OCR website containing the recent DCL includes a "Know Your Rights" flyer that
includes information about the OCR complaint process. U.S. Dep't of Educ., Office for Civil
Rights, Know Your Rights, ED.GoV, http://www2.ed.gov/aboutloffices/list/ocr/know.html (last
modified Mar. 17, 2009). It is unclear, however, what schools are supposed to do with this flyer,
if anything. The DCL does not require that schools post the flyer.
124. Lax Enforcement of Title IX, supra note 50.
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available information devoted to OCR's resolutions of the complaints
that are filed. In fact, the only way that anyone other than a
complainant or the school being investigated can see the resolution of
most cases is through filing a Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA")
request. If a school or individual wishes to see various OCR LOFs but
does not know which ones in particular, one must file a blanket FOIA
request for all of the LOFs in a particular timeframe, against a particular
school, or similar category. With the exception of a couple of recent
cases, 125 the letters are not available in the DOE public FOIA reading
room.
The DOE's own regulations implementing FOIA state that the
agency will keep in its public reading room, "final opinions and orders
in adjudications . . . and copies of all agency records regardless of form

or format released to the public pursuant to a FOIA request that the
Department determines are likely to be the subject of future FOIA
requests."1 26 "Adjudications" is undefined by the regulations, but even
if OCR's "final opinions and orders" in its complaint investigations are
not strictly adjudications, they almost certainly fit into the category of
"agency records . . . released to the public pursuant to a FOIA request
.

.

. likely to be the subject of future FOIA requests." While it is true

that the DOE must determine that a particular already-released record is
likely to be requested again, in the case of OCR investigations involving
peer sexual violence, several bits of evidence indicate that at least some
LOFs have been requested multiple times. Yet, there is a continuing
categorical exclusion of these LOFs from the DOE public reading room.
This evidence includes the CPI's blanket FOIA request for OCR sexual
harassment investigations from 1998 to 2008.127 In addition, I have
filed FOIA requests for a series of LOFs in OCR cases about which I
was aware through a publication called The Educator's Guide to
Controlling Sexual Harassment.12 8 This publication files blanket FOIA
requests and then synopsizes the cases involving new or unique legal
points, facts, and/or conclusions. Therefore, there is a group of LOFs
that not only are "likely to be the subject of future FOIA requests," but

125.

See U.S. Dep't of Educ., Recent Resolutions, ED.GOV, http://www2.ed.gov/aboutloffices/

list/ocr/docs/investigations/index.html (last modified July 13, 2001). These recent cases are a
positive step demonstrating this administration's recognition of and willingness to address the
problem, but these efforts are still quite inadequate when compared to the sheer scope of the
problem and number of past investigations not available in the reading room.
126. 34C.F.R. §5.10(b)(2011).
127. Lax Enforcement of Title IX, supra note 50.
128. See generally EDUCATOR'S GUIDE, supra note 75 (highlighting OCR cases in which

LOFs were written).
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actually have been requested multiple times. 12 9 Combined with the fact
that The Educator's Guide's summaries of OCR cases increases the
likelihood that they will be requested, it seems clear that the DOE
would see this as proof that the LOFs are "likely to be the subject of
future FOIA requests."
Moreover, not only is a FOIA request the only way a member of the
public can read the LOFs, but the request process is particularly lengthy
for these documents. According to its own regulations, the DOE has
twenty working days after the request is received by the appropriate
office to "determine whether to comply with the request."' 30 In
"unusual circumstances," however, this time period may be extended to
a time "arrange[d] with the Department . . . within which the FOIA

request will be processed."131 "Unusual circumstances" include "[t]he
need to search for and collect the requested agency records from field
facilities or other establishments that are separate from the office
processing the request." 32 Since OCR investigations are conducted by
local enforcement offices, 133 "unusual circumstances" are in fact usual
circumstances, and all FOIA requests related to OCR's investigations
are put in a category where there is no definite deadline for the DOE's
response-requests must be "arrange[d] with the Department." 34 It is
therefore impossible to know how quickly or how slowly a FOIA
request might be fulfilled, and there is potential for it to be quite slow
indeed.
Based on this evidence, it appears that the DOE is engaging in a
systemic FOIA violation, one that virtually eliminates a method that
could alleviate one of the information problems discussed above: the
lack of awareness of the non-lawyer first responders and policymakers
at many schools. Such front-line staff might find the time to search files
in a public FOIA reading room to see if the DOE has ever investigated a
complaint that might shed light on the school's own particular policy or
129. A final set of requests about which I am aware was filed by the Georgetown Law
Library. Upon my mentioning the general inaccessibility of the LOFs to Georgetown law
librarians Kumar Jayasuriya, Sarah Rhodes, and Sara Burriesci, they decided to experiment with
developing Georgetown's own database of LOFs to provide a service to the public. They filed
some blanket FOIA requests to obtain a certain number of LOFs directly from the DOE to assess
whether they could be placed into a database. The files they received from DOE were generally
so illegible (from a technical perspective) that the project has been stalled while a technical
solution is sought.
130. 34 C.F.R. § 5.21(c) (2011).
131. Id. § 5.21(e).
132. Id. § 5.21(e)(1).
133.

U.S. Dep't of Educ., Questions and Answers on OCR's Complaint Process, ED.GOV,

http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/qa-complaints.html (last modified May 5, 2009).
134. 34 C.F.R. §5.21(e).
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implementation question. The front-line staff, however, is not going to
take the months and the amount of labor needed to file and receive
results from a blanket FOIA request that might not even contain a case
that is on point.
3. (Suspicions of) Inadequate and Inconsistent Investigations and
Piecemeal Enforcement in Student Complaint Cases
Several other information problems occur as a result of the systemic
FOIA violation in which the DOE is engaging, including a general lack
of accountability for OCR and piecemeal enforcement of Title IX's
First, the lack of transparency regarding OCR's
requirements.
investigations makes it extremely difficult to check those investigations
for consistency or adequacy. In at least a few cases, significant
variation appears to exist between regions in terms of OCR's findings in
peer sexual violence cases, which might have to do (in part) with the
quality of the investigations conducted. For instance, when the
University of California at Santa Cruz was investigated in 1994, the
investigation clearly involved a wide swath of people on campus, not
only those officials who had dealt with the case. 135 Yet in other
investigations, there is evidence that OCR never attempted to speak
with anyone but the complainant and the school officials being
investigated.1 36 Such investigations unsurprisingly often result in
"complainant said, defending school said" situations where ultimately
OCR finds that there was "insufficient evidence" to support the
complainant's allegations.1 37 Third party evidence might have broken
such a stalemate had OCR spoken to third parties.
As mentioned above, CPI undertook the kind of review that would be
next to impossible for most schools or advocates to accomplish: it did a
blanket FOIA request for eleven years worth of OCR Title IX
investigations (1998-2008) and found twenty-four investigations (out of
210 campus sex discrimination investigations) into "allegations that
colleges and universities botched sexual assault cases." 1 38 Only five of
these found the schools responsible for violating Title IX, and in some
cases, OCR did not find violations for some pretty serious school
behavior. For instance, although OCR's own guidance makes clear that
135. Mary Spicuzza, The Missing 47 Survivor Advocates Worry UCSC s Revamped Sex
Offense Policy Promotes Silence Round Sexual Assault, METROACTIVE, http://www.metroactive
.com/papers/cruz/ 1.12.98/rapel-9845.html (last visited Aug. 15, 2010).
136. E-mail from Carolyn Hurwitz to author (Aug. 15, 2010, 4:42 PM) (on file with author).
137. Letter from Sheralyn Goldbecker, Team Leader, Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep't of
Educ., to John J. DeGioia, President, Georgetown Univ. (May 5, 2004) (on file with author)
[hereinafter Georgetown Univ. Letter].
138. Lax Enforcement of Title IX, supra note 50.

240

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 43

retaliation by the school against a survivor for reporting an assault is a
violation of Title IX,139 when Boston University "distributed a press
packet with information about an alleged rape victim, noting that she
was fined for 'disorderly conduct' and drinking alcohol on the night she
was allegedly raped,"1 4 0 OCR did not find the school in violation of
Title IX. In contrast, the University of California at Santa Cruz
investigation found violations of Title IX due to "unclear information
about sex offense policies, poor recordkeeping and inconsistent
disciplinary procedures." 14 1 In the primary investigation discussed by
CPI, moreover, OCR accepted a series of the University of Wisconsin's
excuses for why it delayed addressing a student's report of sexual
assault, including that the school had put its process on hold because a
criminal investigation was occurring.142 This was despite the clear
statement in OCR's own guidance that "[p]olice investigations or
reports . .. do not relieve the school of its duty to respond promptly and

effectively."1 4 3 Such disparate findings raise real questions about how
consistent OCR's enforcement is, but OCR's systemic FOIA violation
makes it nearly impossible to check the accuracy of such suspicions.
In addition, both the FOIA violation and the underlying questions
about the quality and consistency of the investigations themselves lead
to a situation of piecemeal enforcement where some schools are being
held to a higher standard than others. For instance, prior to the recent
DCL, which clarifies that this rule applies to all schools, only schools
that had been investigated had been required to adopt a preponderance
of the evidence standard for school hearings of peer sexual violence
cases. 144 Nothing about a preponderance of the evidence standard
appears in the Revised Guidance, so this appeared to be a requirement
that OCR had developed through its investigations, despite OCR's
disclaimer on its website that "Letters of findings are not formal
statements of OCR policy and they should not be relied upon, cited, or
construed as such."145 Although the DCL has now alleviated this

139. See REVISED GUIDANCE, supra note 72, at 20 (suggesting schools add a provision to

their sexual harassment policies preventing any retaliation against an individual who files a
complaint or participates in a harassment inquiry because retaliation is prohibited by Title IX).
140. Lax Enforcement of Title IX, supra note 50.
141. Spicuzza, supra note 135.
142. Id.
143.

REVISED GUIDANCE, supra note 72, at 21.

144. See Evergreen State Coll. Letter, supra note 44 (applying a "preponderance of evidence"
after the school was investigated); Georgetown Univ. Letter, supra note 137 (requiring a
preponderance of evidence standard upon investigation).
145. OCR Complaint Processing Procedures, supra note 115.
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problem, this could have presented a separate problem under FOIA,
which states, in the section on public reading rooms, that
[a] final order, opinion, statement of policy, interpretation, or staff
manual or instruction that affects a member of the public may be
relied on, used, or cited as precedent by an agency against a party
other than an agency only if(i) it has been indexed and either made available or published as
provided by this paragraph; or
(ii)the party has actual and timely notice of the terms thereof.146
Therefore, to the extent that OCR relies in its enforcement actions on
precedents developed in past investigations, but neither publishes the
LOFs from those investigations nor integrates those precedents into its
guidance, it could be violating FOIA once again.
This piecemeal enforcement has several consequences. First, schools
that have not been investigated are treated differently than those that
Additionally, schools that have been
have been investigated.
investigated are held to different standards than other schools that have
been investigated. This is hardly fair to schools in general, and it is
entirely possible that part of the reason why different schools are being
held to different standards has to do with how well some schools
negotiate versus how well some OCR offices or administrations
negotiate. This is because of the structure of OCR enforcement, which
seeks voluntary compliance because OCR has no ability to do less than
withhold federal funds for a Title IX violation. OCR has no ability to
fine a school, for instance, or to take other punitive measures short of
the "nuclear option" represented by withholding federal funds.147 Since
the comfort level with using OCR's nuclear option seems about the
same as the United States' and Soviet Union's during the Cold War, 148
OCR is left to negotiate a settlement with schools with all of the damage
to its negotiating position that an empty threat can do. All of these
factors lead to uneven enforcement.
These factors also exacerbate the central information problem
discussed in Part I of this Article: the idea that colleges and universities
are in a kind of competition with each other with regard to their public
images and the reporting of sexual violence on campus. Because
enforcement of Title IX is not uniform, some schools are able to get
away with adopting policies more likely to suppress-or at least not
encourage-victim reporting.
Only the schools that have been
investigated are compelled to come into compliance with Title IX and
146. 5 U.S.C.S. § 552(a)(2)(E) (2006).
147. Lax Enforcement of Title LX, supra note 50.
148. Id.
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respond in a fashion that is likely to increase reporting, as the overall
Title IX liability scheme encourages. Given (1) how few people are
even aware of the complaint process; (2) the possibility that OCR will
not insist on full compliance even if a school is investigated; and (3) the
virtual guarantee that OCR will never take any money away from the
school anyway, it seems much less costly to gamble that one might be
investigated and found to have violated Title IX than to risk looking like
a dangerous campus.
4. Lack of Proactive Enforcement
When interviewed by CPI, C. Todd Jones, the OCR Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Enforcement during the George W. Bush administration,
attempted to justify many of the enforcement inadequacies listed above
by saying that investigations are less effective than the behind-thescenes "technical assistance" and other proactive methods adopted by
OCR to get schools to come into compliance. 149 However, Jones also
noted that the Revised Guidance published by the Clinton
administration on one of its last days in office was shelved immediately
and not followed by the subsequent administration, although it was not
publicly rescinded nor were advocates and others aware of its "shelved"
status. 150 In addition, as CPI notes, OCR's budget and staff were cut
over the course of the Bush administration, despite an increase in
complaints to be investigated, impacting the Office's ability to provide
both proactive guidance and technical assistance.151
Thankfully, the Obama administration is taking enforcement more
seriously. The recent DCL, other Dear Colleague Letters, particularly
the one applying Title IX to bullying,152 and the posting of recent
compliance reviews and complaint resolutions in the reading room are
evidence of the Obama administration's commitment to enforcement.
Nevertheless, there are still significant deficiencies in the proactive
steps that OCR takes. First, it is not clear whether the "technical
assistance" mentioned by Jones was allocated to schools other than
those being investigated, and if this was the case, whether that has
changed under the current administration. Therefore, this method
cannot qualify as a purely proactive or preventive approach. If
anything, it is designed to prevent recidivism.

149. Id.
150. Id.
15 1. Id.
152. U.S. Dep't of Educ., Prevention Dear College Letter, ED.GOv, http://www2.ed.gov/
aboutloffices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201010.html (last modified Oct. 26, 2010).
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Second, as already noted, the 2001 Revised Guidance, whether
shelved or not, is quite general and leaves many of the detailed
questions asked by educational administrators unanswered. 5 3 The
DCL has made a good start and helped clarify a number of hitherto
ambiguous issues, but much of both the 2001 Revised Guidance and the
DCL's guidance is not bright-line-rule oriented. The lack of bright-line
rules allows more room for schools to apply the rules in a way that is
arguably not in violation of the letter but clearly in violation of the spirit
of Title IX. The Revised Guidance calls for "prompt and equitable"
processes to determine whether sexual harassment has occurred, but
says nothing about the myriad questions that can arise as to what is
"equitable." For instance, if a school holds hearings to determine
whether sexual violence occurred and gives the accused student the
right to appeal, what are the complaining student's appeal rights? The
DCL does establish that any disciplinary procedure giving the accused
student the right to an appeal must also give that right to the
complaining student, but says nothing about the scope of that right.
Does she get equal access to a full transcript of the hearing, any
evidence submitted and considered, any opinion written by the hearing
These questions are still
board explaining their decision, etc.?
unaddressed and leave open the possibility for a school not to allow
such procedural rights for the complaining student, despite the
inequitable slant of such a decision, just because there is no explicit
directive that schools take these steps. Even a statement such as "when
in doubt, a school should provide any right (in its full scope) that it
gives to an accused student to a complaining student" would be
extremely helpful, but neither the Revised Guidance nor the DCL
contains such a statement.
Finally, although the Obama administration does appear to be taking
a more proactive approach, OCR has made relatively few attempts to
engage in any proactive enforcement such as random compliance
reviews. This means that nearly the entire burden of enforcement falls
on those who file complaints, most likely the survivors of the sexual
violence, who may be too worn out to complain, given that they have
not only been through the traumatizing violence itself, but likely a revictimizing school process (why else would they complain?). This
structure is therefore unlikely to alter the risk-benefit analysis of a
school that would rather risk being investigated and found to have
violated Title IX than risk looking like a dangerous campus.

153. See supra note 120 and accompanying text (discussing how OCR's Revised Guidance
fails to present and answer certain questions that first responders may be asked).
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C. Campus Crime ReportingRequirements and
the UnrealizedSolution of the Clery Act

Potential/current students and their parents are the ultimate audience
schools are concerned about when they face the dilemma of
encouraging victim reporting but looking like a dangerous campus.
Therefore, if the understandable lack of awareness of this audience
could be alleviated, this could influence a school to address its own
unawareness, as well as reduce incentives for schools to actively avoid
knowledge and not adopt effective campus peer sexual violence
response systems. In fact, this was at least in part the motivation behind
the Clery Act.
The Clery Act was spearheaded by the parents of Jeanne Clery, a
Lehigh University first-year student who was raped and murdered by a
fellow student while she was sleeping in her dorm room. 154 The
primary purpose of the Clery Act was to increase transparency around
campus crime so that prospective students and their parents could make
more knowledgeable decisions about which schools to attend. Rep.
Gooding, who sponsored the bill in the House, stated, "The assumption
behind these bills is that making this information available will help
students decide which institution to attend, will encourage students to
take security precautions while on campus, and will encourage higher
education institutions to pay careful attention to security
considerations."1 5 5
As such, the Clery Act's original vision, while not specifically
designed for this purpose, could have gone a long way toward fixing the
central information problem and dilemma faced by schools regarding
encouraging reporting versus public image. Unfortunately, the criteria
by which the Clery Act requires schools to count crime, as well as the
discretion that the statute gives schools and its lack of strict,
comprehensive, and proactive enforcement, have prevented it from
reaching its potential.
According to the 2005 Handbook for Campus Crime Reporting, 15 6
institutions are required to report crimes based on four factors: (1)
where the crime occurred; (2) the type of crime; (3) to whom the crime
154. Jeanne Clery and the SOC Story, SEC. ON CAMPUS, http://www.securityoncampus

.org/index.php?option=com content&view-article&id=126&Itemid=71 (last visited Aug. 12,
2011).
155. 136 CONG. REC. S13128 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 1990) (statement of Sen. Kennedy)
(commenting on S. 580).
156. Please note that the handbook was updated in February 2011. Most of the citations in
this section still refer to the 2005 version because this was the version in place when the crime
reports examined in this article were created. Where the 2011 version retains the same rule as the
2005 version, a reference to the 2011 version will also be included.
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was reported; and (4) when the crime was reported.' 57 Reporting
requirements split university locales into three categories: (1) on
campus (including residence halls); (2) non-campus; and (3) public
property.158 Criminal acts must be reported in three categories: (1) type
of crime (homicide, sex offenses, forcible and non-forcible, robbery,
aggravated assault, burglary, motor vehicle theft, and arson);1 59 (2)
arrests or disciplinary actions related to liquor law violations, drug law
violations, and illegal weapons possession;1 60 and (3) hate crimes.16 1
All reported crimes are defined by the Federal Bureau of Investigation's
Uniform Crime Reporting Handbook ("UCR Handbook"), not local or

state law definitions. 162 A crime is considered "reported"-and thus
necessary for the school to disclose-if it is brought to the attention of a
"campus security authority" or the local police.' 6 3 Notably, "campus
security authority" does not include faculty, campus physicians, or
counselors (mental health, professional, and pastoral).164 Finally,
institutions are instructed to include an incident in its statistics under the
year in which it was reported, not the year the incident took place.165
Institutions are required to disclose all reported crimes, regardless of
whether these reports led to investigations or disciplinary actions, 166
and regardless of whether the survivor chooses to file an official police
report or press charges.167 In addition, it is immaterial whether or not
the perpetrator or survivor is associated with the school. 168 A crime is

157.

OFFICE OF POSTSECONDARY EDUC., U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., THE HANDBOOK FOR

CAMPUS CRIME REPORTING 23 (2005), available at http://www.ed.gov/admins/ead/safety/
handbook.pdf

[hereinafter

CAMPUS

CRIME

REPORTING

HANDBOOK];

OFFICE

OF

POSTSECONDARY EDUC., U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., THE HANDBOOK FOR CAMPUS SAFETY AND
SECURITY REPORTING 11 (2005), available at http://www2.ed.gov/admins/lead/safety/
handbook-2.pdf [hereinafter CAMPUS SAFETY AND SECURITY REPORTING HANDBOOK].

158. 20 U.S.C. § 1092(f)(12) (2006).
159. See id. § 1092(f)(1)(F)(i) (listing the criminal offenses that must be reported by schools);
see also CAMPUS CRIME REPORTING HANDBOOK, supra note 157, at 24-46 (listing and defining
the criminal offenses that must be reported).
160. 20 U.S.C. § 1092(f)(1)(F)(i).
161. Id.
162. Id. § 1092(f)(7).
163.

CAMPUS CRIME REPORTING HANDBOOK, supra note 157, at 23; CAMPUS SAFETY AND

SECURITY REPORTING HANDBOOK, supra note 157, at 73; see also 20 U.S.C.
164.

§ 1092(f)(1)(F)(i).

CAMPUS CRIME REPORTING HANDBOOK, supra note 157, at 51; CAMPUS SAFETY AND

SECURITY REPORTING HANDBOOK, supra note 157, at 77-78.
165. CAMPUS CRIME REPORTING HANDBOOK, supra note 157, at 75; CAMPUS SAFETY AND
SECURITY REPORTING HANDBOOK, supra note 157, at 11.

166. CAMPUS CRIME REPORTING HANDBOOK, supra note 157, at 23; CAMPUS SAFETY AND
SECURITY REPORTING HANDBOOK, supra note 157, at 73.
167. CAMPUS CRIME REPORTING HANDBOOK, supra note 157, at 50; CAMPUS SAFETY AND
SECURITY REPORTING HANDBOOK, supra note 157, at 76.
168. CAMPUS CRIME REPORTING HANDBOOK, supra note 157, at 24; CAMPUS SAFETY AND
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considered to be "reported" if it is "brought to the attention of a campus
security authority or the local police by a victim, witness, other third
party, or even the offender."1 69 Institutions are prohibited from
including personal identifying information about the victim or
perpetrator of any reported crimes. 170
A review of school reports demonstrates significant differences
between reports. Often, schools do not report in the third category (to
whom a report was made), even though it is required.' 7 1 In addition,
there is ample discretion given to schools in defining the boundaries of
the first category. Both providing a map showing the boundaries used
and updating campus boundary definitions on an annual basis are
encouraged, but not required.1 72 There is no automatic review process
of these boundaries-an institution's geographic definitions will only be
reviewed if a complaint is brought.173 Finally, there is variation in
whether schools include statistics gathered from local police.
Institutions are expected to contact local law enforcement agencies to
obtain statistics and compile them with university statistics. 174
However, the institution is only expected to make a good faith effort in
obtaining local law enforcement statistics, a vagary that may result in
different outcomes for schools in the same jurisdiction.175 If local law

SECURITY REPORTING HANDBOOK, supra note 157, at 54.
169.
170.
55.

CAMPUS CRIME REPORTING HANDBOOK, supra note 157, at 24.
Id. at 79; CAMPUS SAFETY AND SECURITY REPORTING HANDBOOK, supra note 157, at

171. For statistics on types of crimes committed in various regions and institutions, see AM.
UNIV., ANNUAL SECURITY REPORT 35-43 (2009), available at https://www.american.edu/
finance/publicsafety/upload/ASR_2009.pdf; Nw. UNIV., ANNUAL SECURITY AND FIRE SAFETY
REPORT 36-41 (2010), available at http://www.northwestern.edu/up/jeanne/2010 _Chicago
EvanstonAnnual SecurityFireSafetyReport.pdf; SYRACUSE UNIV., YOUR SAFETY AND
SECURITY AT SYRACUSE UNIVERSITY 2010, 32-38 (2010), available at http://publicsafety
.syr.edu/uploads/2010%20CIeryl.pdf; Purchase College, PurchaseCollege 2010 Annual Campus
Crime Statistics, PURCHASE.EDU, https:l/ www.purchase.edulsharedmedia/capitalfacilities
planning/upd/purchase%20college%20201 0%20annual%20campus%20crime%20statistics.pdf
(last visited Feb. 27, 2011); University of Chicago, Common Sense: Your Guide to Safe Urban
Living, http://commonsense.uchicago.edu/crime-info.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2011). For an
example of a school that did include the receiver of the crime report in its crime statistics, see
Ohio University, 2009 Clery Act Compliance Report, OHIO.EDU, http://www.ohio.edulpolice/rtk/
upload/2009cleryreport.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2011) (breaking "reported to" categories into
university police, local police, and non-police).
172. CAMPUS CRIME REPORTING HANDBOOK, supra note 157, at 18; CAMPUS SAFETY AND
SECURITY REPORTING HANDBOOK, supra note 157, at 31.
173. See Student Assistance General Provisions, 64 Fed. Reg. 59065 (Nov. 1, 1999)
(analyzing comments and changes for institutional security policies and crime statistics).
174. CAMPUS CRIME REPORTING HANDBOOK, supra note 157, at 54; CAMPUS SAFETY AND
SECURITY REPORTING HANDBOOK, supra note 157, at 82.
175. CAMPUS CRIME REPORTING HANDBOOK, supra note 157, at 54. Two universities in
similar areas of Washington, D.C., reported different abilities to obtain local law enforcement
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enforcement statistics are not broken down in a way that identifies the
specific geographic area in which the crime occurred-making officials
unable to determine if the crime took place within the Clery Act
boundaries-the institution is not obligated to include law enforcement
statistics and is advised to provide a statement indicating that police
statistics did not comport with the Clery Act reporting requirements.1 76
Similarly, if the local law enforcement agency does not comply with the
institution's request (it is not required to do so under the Clery Act), the
institution needs to document this, but needs to do no more. 177
Even in terms of the Clery Act's central and original purpose, giving
potential students and their parents ways to evaluate the safety of a
given campus, the variation that comes from the ample discretion given
to schools and the lack of proactive enforcement makes meaningful
comparisons between schools difficult. Schools can minimize the
crimes that they count by using their discretion in such areas as drawing
the boundaries of the various locations in which they have to report and
gathering statistics from local police. This discretion allows for both
school manipulation of statistics and/or confusion as to the proper way
to collect statistics. CPI's investigation of Clery Act reporting shows at
least such confusion, if not deliberate manipulation, on the part of many
In addition, like with OCR's enforcement of Title IX and
schools."
despite the efforts of the organization created by the Clerys, Security on
Campus, Inc., there is little knowledge of the complaint procedure and
few complaints.179 This lack of awareness, combined with the lack of
proactive compliance reviews by the DOE, means that schools are
rarely held accountable for violations.
statistics. See Georgetown University Campus Security Data, 2006-2008 (on file with author)
(reporting that local police statistics are not available); American University Campus Security
Data, 2006-2008 (on file with author) (reporting that local statistics are included with campus
statistics). Note that in 2009, Georgetown University began including local police statistics in its
annual campus security data. THE CAMPUS SAFETY AND SEC. DATA ANALYSIS CUTTING TOOL,

http://ope.ed.gov/security/index.aspx (follow "Get data for one institution/campus" hyperlink;
then search "Georgetown University").
176. CAMPUS CRIME REPORTING HANDBOOK, supra note 157, at 54; CAMPUS SAFETY AND
SECURITY HANDBOOK, supra note 157, at 87.
CAMPUS CRIME REPORTING HANDBOOK, supra note 157, at 54; CAMPUS SAFETY AND
177.
SECURITY HANDBOOK, supra note 157, at 87.

178. Kristen Lombardi & Kristin Jones, Campus Sexual Assault Statistics Don 'tAdd Up, CTR.
FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (Dec. 3, 2009), http://www.publicintegrity.org/investigations/campus

_assault/articles/entry/I 841/.
179. In fact, most complaints are filed by Security on Campus, Inc. itself. One exception was
the case involving Salem International University, which was originally investigated as a result of
a complaint by the local Chief of Police who suspected that the school was not meeting the
reporting requirements of the Clery Act. Letter from John S. Loreng, Team Leader, Phila. Case
Mgmt. Team, U.S. Dep't of Educ., to Fred Zook, President, Salem Int'l Univ. 2 (Dec. 17, 2001),
available at http://www.securityoncampus.org/pdf/SIUprdl.pdf.
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However, when it comes to sexual violence, the Clery Act suffers
from a more fundamental problem: a definition of campus safety and
security that draws from a tort-based concept of landlord liability and
territorial control, rather than a definition that is centered on a school's
responsibilities to its students. Underlying this definition is a concept of
crime that does not fit what we know about campus peer sexual
violence and in fact plays into the persistent myth of the stranger rapist.
A statute that holds a school responsible for safety and security on the
basis of territorial control assumes that a school can protect students
from crime through its control of facilities, such as campus lighting (no
dark alleys for those stranger rapists to hide) and number of blue light
phones (to get police protection when fleeing the stranger rapist). In
light of where, how, and at whose hands most campus sexual violence
occurs, counting crime based on territorial and facilities control is
unlikely to capture the full extent of the crime-at least of the sex
crimes-happening among the student body. The territorial approach is
also a lot more complicated to understand and allows a lot more room
for manipulation through various territorial boundaries and definitions.
In fact, an amendment proposed to the Senate version of the Clery
Act would have required universities to report all crimes against
students regardless of whether they were committed on college
campuses.' 8 0 However, the amendment was dropped when the Senate
and House versions were reconciled. The original House sponsor, Rep.
Gooding, explained the rejection in a manner demonstrating that his
concept of campus security and crime suffered from the stranger rapist
myth:
Considering the fact that our goal is to provide students with
information on crimes on their campus, the inclusion of all
information on crimes against students would have skewed the data
reported to students in such a manner that they would never know if
their school's security system was effective in protecting students. 181
He also stated, with regard to another part of the Clery Act that requires
schools to send out timely campus warnings about crime, that "[i]t is
unconscionable that a woman can be raped on a college campus and
steps are not taken to warn female students and faculty members so they
can take steps to assure they do not become the next victim."1 82
Obviously, these comments contemplate mainly warnings about
stranger rapists (e.g., "a rape occurred in the northwestern corner of the

180. 136 CONG. REc. S13131 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 1990) (statement of Sen. Specter)
(commenting on S. 580).
181. 136 CONG. REc. HI 1499-500 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1990) (statement of Rep. Goodling).
182. Id.
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Quad at 2 a.m. this morning; the suspect was described as such and such
and is still at large"), since warning about acquaintance rapists would
require including the kind of information that would identify the
survivor and/or suspect both exactly and unnecessarily for purposes of
capture (e.g., "a rape occurred in Old North dormitory, room X, at 2
a.m. this morning").
Other aspects of the Clery Act also show its deficiencies in capturing
campus peer sexual violence in campus crime statistics. The exception
of all faculty and counselors from the definition of "campus security
authority" demonstrates a lack of understanding of the people to whom
sexual violence survivors tend to talk to first and most often.183 While
it is possible to defend this exception on the basis that survivors might
be dissuaded from talking to these people if they had to pass along the
report, it should be noted that the Clery Act requires schools to collect
numbers only, in very general categories, and prohibits schools from
including in their reports any personal identifying information about the
victim or perpetrator of any reported crimes. 184 Many counselors report
such numbers for various purposes, without running afoul of the
confidentiality requirements of their professions.185
In another somewhat baffling and disturbing counting rule under the
Clery Act, homicide, sex offenses, and assault are counted as one
offense per victim, 186 meaning if there are multiple perpetrators and/or
multiple violations involved, such as in a gang rape, the incident is still
only counted once. In contrast, robbery, burglary, and arson are
counted as one offense per distinct incident,18 7 motor vehicle theft is
counted as one offense per stolen vehicle,18 8 and arson and hate crimes

183. See KREBS ET AL., supra note 7, at 5-22 (finding that among undergraduate women who
were victims of sexual assault and who contacted a victims' crisis or health care center, 35.4% of
physically-forced sexual assault victims and 33.3% of incapacitated sexual assault victims
contacted a counselor or therapist affiliated with the university).
184. CAMPUS CRIME REPORTING HANDBOOK, supra note 157, at 79.
185. See, e.g., AM. COUNSELING ASS'N, ACA CODE OF ETHICS § B.7.d. (2005), availableat
http://www.counseling.org/Resources/CodeOfEthics/TP/Home/CT2.aspx ("Use of data derived
from counseling relationships for purposes of training, research, or publication is confined to
content that is disguised to ensure the anonymity of the individuals involved.").
186. CAMPUS CRIME REPORTING HANDBOOK, supra note 157, at 75.
187. Id. at 31, 34, 38. One could view this counting rule as consistent, in that a robbery
perpetrated by three robbers is counted the same as a rape perpetrated by three rapists. Email
from S. Daniel Carter, Dir. of Pub. Policy, Sec. on Campus, Inc., to author (June 18, 2011) (on
file with author). Whereas three people can arguably collaborate to rob one house (i.e., commit
one violation of the victim's property), three people cannot collaborate to commit one violation of
a victim's body. Multiple rape perpetrators must involve multiple violations of the victim's
bodily integrity.
188. CAMPUS CRIME REPORTING HANDBOOK, supra note 157, at 76.
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are reported alongside the other most serious offense in the incident1 89
(e.g., an assault that qualified as a hate crime would be counted as one
assault and one hate crime). That the rules for counting crime would
not require a gang rape to be counted for every separate violation,
especially in a context that is distressingly well-known for the gangrape phenomenon,190 is bizarre at best and appalling at worst. It is not
only a symbolic insult to the survivor of gang rape, but also provides
less incentive for schools to address the gang-rape phenomenon. After
all, if a school must only report one sex offense as opposed to ten or
even five, what additional incentive does the crime-reporting structure
really give to schools to take gang rape seriously?
It appears that this counting rule has its origin in the FBI's UCR
Handbook.191 The UCR Handbook also defines forcible sex offenses as
"carnal knowledge of a female forcibly and against her will ,"192 with
the further definition of carnal knowledge as "the act of a man having
sexual bodily connections with a woman; sexual intercourse" and the
specification that there is carnal knowledge if there is the slightest
penetration of the sexual organ of the female (vagina) by the sexual
organ of the male (penis). 193 Although the Clery Act regulations allow
schools to use either the UCR Handbook or the National Incident-Based
Reporting System ("NIBRS") version of the UCR Handbook,194 which
uses "person" instead of "woman," 1 95 depending on which version a
school uses, this definition could mean that all male victims of sexual
violence are made completely invisible and that sexual violence that
does not involve acts that can be characterized as "sexual bodily
connections" or attempted "sexual bodily connections" need not be
reported, despite how equally violating they might be. Although the
Clery Act presumably stays away from state law sex offense definitions
for consistency purposes, considering the amount of reform that has
189.

Id.

190. In fact, the term "gang rape" was first coined by Dr. Bernice Sandler in an article written
about gang rape on college campuses. E-mail from Bernice Sandler, Senior Scholar, Women's
Research & Educ. Inst., to author (May 11, 2011) (on file with author).
191. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING
HANDBOOK 47 (rev. 2004), available at http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/additional-ucrpublications/ucr handbook.pdf.
192. Id. at 19.
193. Id. at 20.
194. 34 CFR §668.46(c)(7) (2010).
195. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING
NATIONAL INCIDENT-BASED REPORTING SYSTEM, VOLUME 1: DATA COLLECTION GUIDELINES
33 (2000), available at http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/nibrs/nibrs dcguide.pdf/. Note that
although the NIBRS edition also makes changes to the reporting of multiple offenses, the Clery
regulations specify that "in determining how to report crimes committed in a multiple-offense
situation an institution must use the UCR Reporting Handbook." 34 C.F.R. § 668.46(c)(7).
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gone into defining sex offenses under state laws, 196 nearly any one of

196. The UCR definition is based on the common law definition of rape. Beginning in the
1970s, however, states began massive reforms of rape laws, making laws gender neutral,
eliminating the element of consent, and introducing additional forms of sexual assault that do not
include force or threat of force, such as when the victim is incapacitated. See JOEL EPSTEIN &
STACIA LANGENBAHN, THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND COMMUNITY RESPONSE TO RAPE 8 (1994)

(explaining that during the past twenty years, modem statutes have broadened and redefined
rape); see also Sexual Assault in the United States, THE ADVOCATES FOR HUMAN RIGHTS,

http://stopvaw.org/a6200a22-49cf-4680-aOlb-e862d23ccfb6.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2011)
(explaining that in the 1970s, states began passing laws aimed at improving conviction rates and
encouraging victims to report by redefining sexual assault, criminalizing marital rape, preventing
the defense from investigating the victim's history, and more). The laws in Michigan and Illinois
are considered models of rape law reform. Id. The Michigan statute holds in part:
(1) A person is guilty of criminal sexual conduct in the first degree if he or she engages
in sexual penetration with another person and if any of the following circumstances
exists:
(c) Sexual penetration occurs under circumstances involving the commission of
any other felony.
(d) The actor is aided or abetted by I or more other persons and either of the
following circumstances exists:
(i) The actor knows or has reason to know that the victim is mentally
incapable, mentally incapacitated, or physically helpless.
(ii) The actor uses force or coercion to accomplish the sexual penetration.
Force or coercion includes, but is not limited to, any of the circumstances
listed in subdivision (f).
(e) The actor is armed with a weapon or any article used or fashioned in a manner
to lead the victim to reasonably believe it to be a weapon.
(f) The actor causes personal injury to the victim and force or coercion is used to
accomplish sexual penetration. Force or coercion includes, but is not limited to,
any of the following circumstances:
(i) When the actor overcomes the victim through the actual application of
physical force or physical violence.
(ii) When the actor coerces the victim to submit by threatening to use force
or violence on the victim, and the victim believes that the actor has the
present ability to execute these threats.
(iii) When the actor coerces the victim to submit by threatening to retaliate
in the future against the victim, or any other person, and the victim believes
that the actor has the ability to execute this threat. As used in this
subdivision, "to retaliate" includes threats of physical punishment,
kidnapping, or extortion.
(iv) When the actor engages in the medical treatment or examination of the
victim in a manner or for purposes that are medically recognized as
unethical or unacceptable.
(v) When the actor, through concealment or by the element of surprise, is
able to overcome the victim ....
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.520b (2011). It should be noted that other provisions of Michigan's
penal code hold that the victim need not resist. Id. § 750.520i. The Illinois statute holds:
(a) A person commits criminal sexual assault if that person commits an act of sexual
penetration and:
(1) uses force or threat of force; or
(2) knows that the victim is unable to understand the nature of the act or is unable
to give knowing consent ....
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those definitions seems like it would be preferable to these disturbingly
antiquated ones.
In light of all of these problems, it is no wonder that the Clery Act
has not fulfilled its promise for improving public knowledge of what is
happening at most schools, never mind solving the dilemma of whether
to risk looking like a dangerous campus by encouraging victim
reporting. Even if it had avoided allowing schools too much discretion
to minimize reporting if they wish to do so (and it should be noted that
some schools do not in fact appear to be minimizing reporting-some
might even be characterized as maximizing reporting), the ways that it
counts crime demonstrate fundamental misunderstandings about how
campus peer sexual violence operates. Additionally, because campus
peer sexual violence "is the most common violent crime on American
college campuses today,"' 97 to be at all accurate, the Clery Act must
structure its rules to represent campus peer sexual violence correctly.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
In light of the series of information problems discussed in Part III, a
whole list of changes is needed if the laws dealing with campus peer
sexual violence are going to eliminate the counterincentives to the
overall liability scheme's support of institutional responses that
encourage victim reporting. Accordingly, this Part proposes the
adoption of a constructive knowledge approach in Title IX private
lawsuits. Next, this Part suggests several improvements to OCR's
enforcement of Title IX. Part IV concludes with suggestions for
possible amendments to the Clery Act. The adoption of these changes
could go a long way in eliminating incentives for schools to remain
passively unaware and actively avoid knowledge of campus peer sexual
violence. It could likewise discourage schools from doing anything that
might keep potential students and parents uninformed.
A. Adopt a Constructive Knowledge Approach
in Title IX PrivateLaw Suits

A dozen years of Title IX litigation under Gebser and Davis have
shown that the actual knowledge standard simply does not create
incentives for schools to respond adequately to peer sexual violence.
Gebser and Davis have not even encouraged schools to pass policies or
to establish effective procedures for addressing campus peer sexual

720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-1.20 (2011) (amending and renumbering 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1213).
197. SAMPSON, supra note 8, at 1.
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violence and harassment or to encourage victim reporting--changes that
the Faragher/Ellerthdecisions have at least arguably achieved in terms
of employer behavior. 198 The Faragher/Ellerthapproach has not been
without controversy,1 99 and a full discussion of its merits and demerits
is outside the scope of this Article. It is clear, however, that schools
have not been encouraged to take even the minimal steps that
Faragher/Ellerthhave encouraged in the employment context, and
unsurprisingly, very little progress has been made in preventing and
ending campus peer sexual violence. As a result, we are now left with
the unjust result that children and young people with fewer resources to
deal with sexual harassment and violence are less protected at their
schools-where their attendance for at least the early years is
compulsory-than their adult parents are at their non-compulsory

workplaces. In addition, little progress has been made in establishing a
legislative fix, as invited by the Court in Gebser.20 0 The proposed 2008
Civil Rights Act sadly died in committee and likely would have had to
overcome a presidential veto even if it had made it to a floor vote. 2 0 1
In light of the litigation experience over the last decade and the
failure of Congress to change these unjust results, it is time for the
Supreme Court to revisit its decisions in Gebser and Davis or for
Congress to re-introduce and pass legislation similar to the 2008 Civil
Rights Act. Either way, the standard that should be adopted is a
constructive knowledge standard, which is consistent with the
administrative standard used by OCR and avoids the criticism that has
been leveled at Faragher/Ellerth. With genuine incentives based on
such potentially expensive liability, schools might actually act in the
responsible and concerned manner the Court attributed to schools in
Gebser.202

198.

Grossman, supra note 107, at 4.

199. Id

200. Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 293-93 (1998) ("Until Congress
speaks directly on the subject, however, we will not hold a school district liable in damages under
Title IX for a teacher's sexual harassment of a student absent actual notice and deliberate
indifference.").
201. Civil Rights Act of 2008, S.2554, 110th Cong. (2008). The 110th Congress ran until
January 5, 2009, when President George W. Bush was still in the White House. Years and
Session Dates of the US Congress, GPO ACCESS, http://www.gpoaccess.gov/help/congress
table.html (last visited Aug. 16, 2011). For this reason, at least one commentator did not
anticipate that the bill would "go anywhere." Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Civil Rights Act of 2008,
2
8
WORKPLACE PROF BLOG (Jan. 28, 2008), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/laborprof blog/ 00 /
01/civil-rights-ac.html.
202. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 289.
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B. Improve Office for Civil Rights Enforcement

Both Congress and the DOE should take steps to improve OCR's
enforcement of Title IX in peer sexual harassment cases, including the
appropriation of funds to increase staff and programs. The Obama
administration is already making improvements to the proactive
guidance and the availability of its enforcement actions to the public.
These steps are only the beginning, however, and more must be done.
Specifically, OCR must continue to create proactive guidance giving
more specific instructions to schools about how to handle sexual
harassment and violence directed at students. The recent DCL, in
particular its confirmation that the appropriate standard of proof for
disciplinary hearings on sexual harassment and violence is a
preponderance of the evidence, 20 3 is already having an effect on
schools: nearly a dozen have announced that they have changed or are
reviewing their standards in light of the guidance.204 The DCL also
clarifies such issues as the complaining and accused students' equal
rights to counsel, 205 access to and advance notice of witnesses and other
evidence,2 0 6 and rights to appeal.2 07 Nevertheless, certain questions
203. The DCL itself establishes the ample legal support that it has for this rule. Dear
Colleague Letter, supra note 67, at 10-11. For the myriad additional justice and policy-related
reasons why this standard of proof is appropriate, see Cantalupo, supra note 2.
204. See, e.g., Daniel de Vise, University of Virginia's ProposedRules Aimed at Empowering
Victims of Sexual Misconduct, WASH. POST, May 7, 2011, at Bl, available at

http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/univ-of-virginias-proposed-rules-would-lowerstandard-for-sexual-misconduct/2011/05/05/AFwQVtlFstory.html (showing how the University
of Virginia is implementing new policies to conform to the new national guidelines, including a
new standard of review for sexual assault cases); Editorial, New Standard of ProofBetter, But
Still Needs Work, STAN. REv. (Apr. 18, 2011), http:// stanfordreview.org/article/ editorial-newstandard-of-proof-better-but-still-needs-work (discussing Stanford University's decision to lower
the standard of proof in cases involving sexual misconduct); Jordi Gass6, New Committee Advises
on "Campus Climate," YALE DAILY NEWS,

Apr. 18,

2011, available at http://www.

(discussing
yaledailynews.com/news/20 11/apr/1 8/new-committee-advises-on-campus-climate/
the Yale University president's creation of an external advisory committee to advise him on how
to handle sexual misconduct more efficiently); Karin Kapsidelis, UVA Plans to Raise Sexual
Misconduct Policy, DAILY PROGRESS (May 5, 2011), http://www 2.dailyprogress.com/
news/2011/may/05/uva-plans-revise-sexual-misconduct-policy-ar-1020158/ (reviewing UVA's
decision to lower the standard of proof necessary and to broaden the scope of offenses in sexual
misconduct cases); Jon Ostrowsky, New Federal Guidance on Univ Sexual Assault: Brandeis
Follows Biden Lead on Title A7, BRANDEIS HOOT, Apr. 8, 2011, at 1, available at

http://thebrandeishoot.com/articles/10159 (highlighting Brandeis University's decision to lower
the standard of proof for internal hearings on sexual assault); Michael Tabb, SU Senate Approves
Changes to Student Judicial Code, STUDENT LIFE, Apr. 15, 2011, at 1, 3, available at

http://www.studlife.com/news/student-union/2011/04/15/su-senate-approves-changes-to-studentjudicial-code! (discussing Washington University in St. Louis' new policies in response to the
new Title IX changes).
205. Dear ColleagueLetter, supra note 67, at 12.

206. Id at 11.
207. Id. at 12.
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remain unanswered. There is particularly a need to define a default
"equitable" rule by clarifying that, absent an OCR statement to the
contrary, when a school gives a right of any kind to the accused student,
it must also give the same right, of the same scope, to the complaining
student. This rule would apply regardless of whether it was in a campus
disciplinary proceeding or other procedure for investigating complaints
and determining responsibility and sanction in peer sexual violence
cases.
In addition, better guidance is needed on what constitutes
institutionalretaliation against survivors who report. The 2001 Revised
Guidance and DCL both discuss the school's obligation to protect
victims from retaliatory harassment from the harasser or the harasser's
friends, 208 but there is no discussion of what constitutes retaliation by
the institution itself. Yet there is evidence that some school behavior
does itself seem retaliatory. Examples include, as described above,
distributing a press packet to local media about a survivor after she
reports an assault, stating that she was charged by the school with
alcohol consumption and "disorderly conduct" in connection with the
events at issue in her report,209 publicly stating that the victim's report
did not constitute a "real rape," 210 or refusing to enforce a court-issued
stay-away order after telling the survivor that her assailant was "very
bright, very intelligent, and 'going places."' 211 Improved guidance can
and should make clear that such school behavior will be considered a
very serious violation of Title IX.
Finally, the guidance should include the creation and publication of a
model sexual violence and harassment policy and process for handling
complaints under the policy. There are certainly sources of "best
practices" regarding such policies and procedures available, 212 and
Students Active For Ending Rape ("SAFER") provides an innovative
project whereby students and others can assess their schools' policies
and by doing so, add to a national database of such policies. 2 13
Nevertheless, all of these efforts are voluntary and require schools to
take the initiative and commit the necessary resources to adopt them.
The SAFER project in particular is also more focused on policies,
which is absolutely a necessary first step, but does not address many
208. Id. at 4-5, 16.
209. Lax Enforcement of Title

IX, supra note 50.

210. Kelly v. Yale Univ., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4543, at *3 (D. Conn. Mar. 26, 2003).
211. Doe v. Erskine Coll., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35780, at *33-34 (D.S.C. May 25, 2006).
212. For a more extensive discussion of various best practices related to student disciplinary
policies and procedures related to sexual violence, see Cantalupo, supra note 2, at 665-80.
213. Campus Accountability Project, SAFER, http://safercampus.org/campus-accountabilityproject (last visited Aug. 15, 2011).
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problems of implementation and procedure, which can make an
otherwise good policy virtually worthless. The discretionary nature of
choosing to follow best practices also is more likely to result in a policy
that does not in fact comport with best practices. In contrast, if OCR
were to issue model policies and procedures, schools would have
serious incentives to adopt them. Schools' behavior in response to the
DCL demonstrates that many schools will take such incentives
seriously. 2 14
To the extent that proactive guidance will never be able to address
every question or circumstance that arises under the law, OCR must
increase the visibility of its complaint process and the results of its
investigations. LOFs that conclude OCR investigations, and any
"Commitments to Resolve" or settlements reached in such cases dating
back to at least the early 1990s, should be made accessible to the public
through a FOIA electronic reading room.
More importantly,
accessibility to LOFs could keep schools from being sued and could
prevent both schools and OCR from having to go through expensive
investigations by allowing schools to resolve their questions up front
and proactively comply. Having access to the LOFs could also enhance
the abilities of survivors and their advocates to advocate for beneficial
policy approaches, since the law supports greater rights for victims.
The DOE could publicize both the availability of the complaint
process and the LOFs by sending information directly to the student
government or student media on a campus. Congress or the DOE could
also mandate that information about how to file complaints with the
DOE under both the Clery Act and Title IX be published in each
school's Clery Act report. Schools could also be required to give this
information to students as a part of the written notification that would
be required by the proposed Campus Sexual Violence Elimination Act
("SaVE Act") discussed below. 215 The DCL's emphasis on the role of
Title IX Coordinators and its training requirements for all personnel
involved in responding to sexual violence cases should also be used to
disseminate information about the complaint process and complaint
resolutions by requiring that Title IX Coordinators provide information
about OCR's process to students (like OCR does on its "Know Your
Rights" flyer 2 16) and including OCR's guidance and complaint process
in personnel trainings. All of these steps would make the complaint

214.
215.
216.
You Go

Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 289 (1998).
For more details on the Campus SaVE Act, see infra notes 219-20.
Know Your Rights: Title IX Prohibits Sexual Harassment and Sexual Violence Where
to School, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, http://www2.ed.gov/about/

officeslist/ocr/docs/title-ix-rights-201104.html (last visited Sept. 18, 2011).
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process more accessible to students, aid OCR's Title IX enforcement
efforts (especially as they stand now, where they depend strictly on
complaints), and increase school accountability and compliance with
Title IX. At the very least, school officials will be reminded of their
legal obligations every time this notice is published in the crime report
or given to a victim, and such a reminder could prompt schools to make
sure their response processes comply with the law.
As helpful as making the complaint process and the result of
complaints more accessible would be, OCR should also initiate more
investigations or compliance reviews of schools. A certain number of
schools could be selected at random every year for a compliance
review/investigation. This would not only create incentives for schools
to come into compliance on their own, in anticipation of a review, but
would also provide an avenue for OCR's technical assistance services to
be spread more evenly throughout institutions. Moreover, this would
alleviate the ineffective and unjust consequences in the current system
of placing such a burden on survivors. The entire burden of tracking
schools' compliance and ensuring schools' accountability would no
longer be exclusively borne by victims, who have already been through
a tremendous amount of trauma by the point that they file an OCR
complaint.
Although the ongoing failure to make OCR's LOFs easily accessible
to the public hinders true assessments of the quality of OCR's
resolutions, with regard to both proactive and reactive investigations,
OCR likely needs to develop methods of achieving more consistency
and accountability among its enforcement office investigators.
Therefore, it should make efforts to improve its guidelines and training
for all investigators on the most effective investigatory techniques. In
doing so, OCR's enforcement would apply more fairly by holding
schools accountable to similar standards and applying Title IX's
obligations more consistently. Unless requested not to do so by the
complainant, investigations should, at a minimum, include talking to
people suggested by the complainant and, if policies and processes are
at issue, to people in the campus community through open forums or
other gatherings of interested parties. Such investigative methods
would not allow the defending school to control the information that
OCR receives regarding the complained-of behavior and would give
OCR third-party perspectives that could help OCR come to more
accurate conclusions.
All of these improvements will of course require significantly more
resources. Therefore, Congress should appropriate more money for
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OCR to increase staffing and enforcement efforts. 2 17 While the current
political climate might not be entirely conducive to immediate
appropriation of funds, better funding should remain on the list of
priorities. In addition, if OCR were given the power to fine schools,
such an approach would help fix two enforcement problems at once:
first, by providing OCR with an enforcement mechanism short of the
"nuclear option" of withholding all federal funds and, second, by
potentially adding a funding source for OCR's work.2 18
C. Amend the Clery Act
The Clery Act has been amended quite a bit since it was first passed,
and a new set of amendments has been proposed in this (the 112th)
Congress via the SaVE Act. 2 19 In its current form, the SaVE Act would
add the following measures: (1) require schools to include domestic
violence, dating violence, and stalking in the statistics schools must
collect; (2) require schools to include in their annual security report a
statement of policy and procedures related to such offenses; (3) mandate
that schools provide educational programming promoting awareness
about the violence; and (4) encourage cooperation between the
Departments of Education and Justice in providing assistance to schools
on best practices for responding to and preventing such offenses. 220
The SaVE Act would further require schools to notify student victims of
their rights, disciplinary processes, victim services, and safety planning,
including how the school will enforce any protective order and protect
victim confidentiality. 22 ' Finally, the SaVE Act would require the
school's policy to include the educational programming previously
mentioned, possible sanctions or protective measures imposed
following disciplinary action, and procedures available to victims postviolence, including to whom the victim can report, disciplinary

217. In fact, the Center for Public Integrity indicates that OCR's funding has shrunk over the
last decade, whereas complaints have gone up. See Lax Enforcement of Title IX, supra note 50

("In fiscal year 2009, OCR had 582 full-time staffers-fewer than at any time since its creation.
And it received 6,364 complaints, an increase of 27% since 2002.").
218. Developing "proposals for remedial powers other than complete de-funding of
recipients" has been a goal of OCR's since its most recent strategic plan. OCR Strategic Plan FY
2000, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, http://www2.ed.gov/aboutloffices/list/

ocr/strategic2000.html (last modified Mar. 9, 2005). However, it is unclear what progress, if any,
has been made on that goal.
219. S. 834, 112th Cong. (1st Sess. 2011); H.R. 2016, 112th Cong. (1st Sess. 2011); Lauren
Siebin, Education Dept. Issues New Guidance for Colleges' Sexual-Assault Investigations,

CHRON., Apr. 15, 2011, at A20-21.
220. S. 834; H.R. 2016.
221. S. 834; H.R. 2016.
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procedures, as well as the option and assistance available to change
academic, living, transportation, and working situations. 222
While all of these proposed amendments would be distinct
improvements on the state of the law, they do not primarily address the
information problems and the way the Clery Act exacerbates those
problems. Therefore, several amendments should be added to the SaVE
Act.
If the Clery Act is ever going to attain its original goal of providing
prospective and current students and their parents with accurate
information about the incidence of sexual violence on a particular
campus, it needs to fundamentally change its approach to collecting that
information. Specifically, it needs to stop depending on victim
reporting. The Clery Act should therefore be amended to collect
information about campus peer sexual violence (and any other violent
criminal behavior with similar non-reporting problems) in a manner
more likely to produce useful information that will both make it
impossible for a campus to hide behind non-reporting and provide the
school with the information it needs to address the problem properly.
More specifically, schools should be required to administer a
standard survey developed by the DOE or a contractor every four years
or a similarly appropriate interval via a method that would guarantee a
high response rate (e.g., requiring a response to the survey in order to
graduate or to register for classes) and would ask students questions
designed to determine the incidence of sexual violence without
depending on individual survivors to come forward to report. The
results of the survey should be submitted to the DOE and be published
in the campus crime report. The DOE could also do statistical
comparisons of survey results from schools and ideally make those
available to the public. As already noted, many schools already
participate voluntarily in similar surveys, 223 which often include such
compilations, and are given to schools confidentially for their own
use. 224 Schools generally use information from these surveys to inform
themselves of what students are experiencing and to develop policies
and programs for responding to those experiences. 225 As helpful as
222. S. 834; H.R. 2016.
223. Cf SAMPSON, supra note 8, at 9 (noting that college studies still find that many men and
women on campus have little understanding of acquaintance rape).
224. See, e.g., National College Health Assessment II, AM. COLL. HEALTH ASS'N-NAT'L
COLL. HEALTH ASSESSMENT II, http://www.acha-ncha.org/docs/ACHA-NCHAIIsample.pdf

(last visited Sept. 19, 2011) (questioning college students about their health and safety in a
confidential and voluntary survey).
225. For instance, the American College Health Association's National College Health
Assessment states the survey's purpose as: "[E]nabling both ACHA and institutions of higher
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such surveys can be, even with a comparatively small group of schools
participating, 226 imagine the wealth of information about students that
schools and the public could obtain from a survey in which all schools
must participate.
Such a survey would essentially remove the school from its current
"middle-man" position, where students report to the school and then the
school reports to the public. The survey would enable students to report
directly to the public what is happening among students on every
campus across the country. School officials would receive campusspecific information that is easily comparable to national incidence
rates. If the trend demonstrated by studies done thus far is any judge,
schools would get hard data indicating that their campuses have just as
much sexual violence as any other. Such data would thus make it
nearly impossible for a school to claim that, despite national statistics, it
is different from the national norm, unless the school actually is
different. Schools would no longer be able to bury their heads in the
sand about this problem and pretend like the lack of student reports
indicates the lack of a problem. With such a survey in place, schools
would simply have no incentives to minimize reporting either passively
or actively.
This survey does not necessarily need to replace the Clery Act's
current reporting structure, although it is worth considering whether the
resources that schools and other entities put toward meeting the Clery
Act's current requirements would be more efficiently and effectively
utilized with either such a survey and/or the victim services office
discussed below. 2 2 7 If the reporting system remains in place, however,
the Clery Act must be amended to change its definitions and methods of
"counting" reports. Crimes should be counted in a manner that
accounts for crimes where both the survivor and alleged perpetrator are
members of the campus community (students, faculty, and staff),
regardless of where the crime occurred. Especially if combined with a
territorial approach, such a method would capture almost all crimes
education to adequately identify factors affecting academic performance, respond to questions
and concerns about the health of the nation's students, develop a means to address these concerns,
and ultimately improve the health and welfare of those students." National College Health
Assessment, AM. COLL. HEALTH ASS'N-NAT'L COLL. HEALTH ASSESSMENT, http://www.achancha.org/ (last visited Sept. 19, 2011).

226. About 40-140 schools per semester participated in the National College Health
Assessment in the two most recently surveyed full academic years (2008-2009 and 2009-2010),
with a total of about 180-200 schools participating per academic year. Like proposed here, the
National College Health Assessment does not appear to be administered every year by all
participating schools. Participation History, AM. COLL. HEALTH ASS'N-NAT'L COLL. HEALTH

ASSESSMENT, http://www.acha-ncha.org/partic history.html (last visited Sept. 19, 2011).
227. See infra notes 229-30 and accompanying text.
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where the school has both a responsibility to protect a student, faculty,
or staff member and/or some control over the alleged perpetrator, the
facilities where the crime took place, or both. Counting based on
people involved would capture many crime reports involving student
perpetrators that do not take place on campus (e.g., in houses owned by
fraternities or hotel rooms rented for parties), which is where most
campus peer sexual violence occurs. 228 At the same time, the territorial
approach would capture crimes on campus committed against students
or other members of the campus community by outsiders. Together,
these approaches would decrease schools' discretion under the Clery
Act and would make the reporting system more accurate.
Other methods can also help minimize schools' discretion in
reporting and decrease schools' incentives to curtail reporting. All
campus crime reports should be required to include mandatory standard
language explaining how to interpret the data, including some
acknowledgement of the significance of the non-reporting problem and
the counterintuitive meaning of greater sexual violence reports. Like
with Title IX, the complaint process should be mandated to appear on
every campus report, and the DOE should engage in more proactive
enforcement, such as reviewing a random selection of campus crime
reports for full compliance with the Clery Act, in addition to
investigating complaints. Although not as good as the nationwide
survey option, such steps would create incentives for schools to provide
more consistent information to prospective and current students, their
parents, and the general public so that schools' safety records can be
compared more meaningfully.
Any amendments should also get rid of the FBI's UCR Handbook,
either by finding a more modern model, such as the FBI's own NIBRS
edition of the UCR Handbook, or by creating new definitions just for
the Clery Act. In particular, multiple perpetrators committing multiple
sexually-violent acts against a single victim should be counted by
violent act, not by victim or by perpetrator (to account for those sexual
assault scenarios where one perpetrator commits multiple violent acts)
and the definitions should allow male victims to be counted. Such
counting rules would give a more accurate picture of the campus peer
sexual violence problem and would acknowledge the different
understanding of sexual violence that exists in modem society,
including that men can be victims and that sexual violence should not

228.

See KREBS ET AL., supra note 7, at 5-19 (noting that among the respondents, a

significantly large amount of sexual assault victims were at a party when the incident took place
and that the most commonly-reported locations were the victim's or some other person's living
quarters).
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be treated like a property crime (which is implied by using the same
counting rules for gang rapes and robberies with multiple robbers).
A final method, which ideally would be combined with the survey
discussed above, would be to require schools, either under Title IX or
the Clery Act, to create certain programs related to peer sexual violence
and then to funnel reporting through those programs. For instance, one
of the most effective ways of addressing the myriad challenges related
to addressing peer sexual violence on campus is to create a visible (yet
confidential) and centralized victims' services office. 22 9
This method has received increasing recognition as a best practice for
responding to campus peer sexual violence. 2 30 A victims' services
office could help with reporting by acting as a central location for both
services and reports. One can picture a campus student services system
for sexual violence victims as a metaphorical wheel, with a victims'
services office at the hub of the wheel and the various places where a
student might initially report at the ends of the wheel spokes. These
places could include the medical center, campus police, counseling
services, residence life, individual faculty, the student conduct office,
etc. This wheel-like structure allows the offices where a student
initially reports to immediately refer the student to the victims' services
office. That office could likewise refer students out to the different
offices from which they can receive needed services, thus alleviating a
victim's need to go from office to office trying to figure out the system
on her own.
The victims' services office could also provide a critical role for the
institution by being a source of expertise in an area where schools need
a lot more information and training, especially in light of the training
requirements and education recommendation contained in the DCL,
which will be strengthened further by the Campus SaVE Act, should it
be enacted into law. 231 Office staff would have the background and
knowledge to implement such training and education programs and
could provide deeper expertise in active cases. Faculty and staff could

229. In my 2009 article, I focused on how such offices could play the role of confidential
advocate for survivors in a variety of campus settings and procedures. Cantalupo, supra note 2,
at 681. However, such offices can also play critical roles for the institution, especially when it
comes to reporting and responding properly to such reports.
230. See, e.g., KARJANE ET AL., supra note 67, at 132 (noting a dedicated, on-campus victim
services office as an "encouraging practice"); OVW FISCAL YEAR 2011 GRANTS, supra note 67
(mandating that no less than 20% of the funds granted to a school to combat sexual assault,
stalking and domestic and dating violence go towards a victim services program where no oncampus or off-campus program currently exists).
231. Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 67, at 4, 7, 12, 14-15. In addition, for information
regarding the SaVE Act, see supra notes 219-20.
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be minimally trained in how to handle reports, mainly by referring them
to the victims' services office as the campus expert, which usually is a
relief to the majority of faculty and staff members who do not feel
prepared to deal with such reports. Survivors would also be more likely
to report to a confidential advocate and all-around resource, and such an
office could provide raw numbers without breaching confidentiality.
Centralizing reports with a victims' services office is one of the most
effective ways of both getting survivors to report and making sure an
institution's response is effective once a report occurs.
In light of the benefits of such offices, the most effective way for the
Clery Act to both capture reports and ensure that sexual violence
survivors' rights are protected (as required by a different portion of the
Clery Act, commonly referred to as the Sexual Assault Victim's Bill of
Rights) may very well be to mandate that every school create and
professionally staff such an office. Such an approach would not only
increase reporting, but would also provide an on-campus expert who
would facilitate creation of the right policies and procedures, as well as
preventive educational programming. A legal regime that truly wants to
end the campus peer sexual violence problem could not do better than
mandating such an office at every school.
V. CONCLUSION

At nearly every one of the half dozen or so presentations that I have
given on my 2009 article on this subject, a college administratorusually from the judicial affairs or student conduct office-has
challenged my characterization of one piece of law related to campus
peer sexual violence as a myth. The particular legal controversy
involved a supposed conflict between a provision of the Clery Act and
the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act ("FERPA"). FERPA
generally does not allow educational institutions to disclose information
from a student's educational record, which could include the results of
student disciplinary proceedings, to anyone besides the student unless
the student gives written consent.232 However, as early as 2001, OCR's
Revised Guidance made it clear that FERPA did not override the rights
given by Title IX. 233 In addition, the implementing regulations for the
232. See Letter from LeRoy S. Rooker, Dir., Family Policy Compliance Office, U.S. Dep't of
Educ., to S. Daniel Carter, Dir. of Pub. Policy, Sec. on Campus, Inc. (Mar. 10, 2003), available
at http://www.ed.gov/policy/gen/guid/fpco/ferpa/library/carter.html (last visited Aug. 15, 2010)
(explaining that under FERPA, a crime victim that receives the final results of an institution's
disciplinary proceeding may not re-disclose that information without appropriate written consent
from the student).
233.

See REVISED GUIDANCE, supra note 72, at 22 (noting that FERPA does not override

federally-protected due process rights of those accused and the Title LX rights of the
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Clery Act state that "[c]ompliance with this paragraph does not
constitute a violation of the Family Educational Rights and Privacy
Act." 234 Despite this relatively clear statement, schools were concerned
about whether the accuser, once informed of a disciplinary procedure's
outcome, could then re-disclose that information. Many schools
therefore required survivors to sign nondisclosure agreements before
they were informed of the outcome of disciplinary proceedings. 235
Understandably, victims and victims' advocates objected to such
measures because they compelled victims' silence. 236 In light of how
difficult many survivors find it to come forward at all, and the reasons
listed above for why they do not report, such a "gag rule" could
facilitate victim-blaming responses. Moreover, given the typical
dynamics of campus sexual violence cases (where the perpetrator and
survivor know each other and have a common group of acquaintances,
but where the alleged violence took place without any witnesses),
survivors often find their credibility being judged not only in formal
disciplinary processes, but also informally by everyone around them.237
Getting a neutral panel to find that her account of events was credible,
never mind that what happened to her was wrong, can therefore be very
important to a survivor. An inability to re-disclose the very finding that
establishes her credibility and her assailant's culpability significantly
diminishes the value of going through the process at all. Even worse, it
can allow the perpetrator to exploit the survivor's compelled silence by
lying about the outcome to others. All in all, it sets a victim up to feel
re-victimized by the system. 238
complainant).
234. 20 U.S.C. § 1232(g) (2006); 34 C.F.R. § 668.46(b)( 11)(vi)(B) (2010).
235. See Letter from Nancy Paula Gifford to S. Daniel Carter, supra note 48 (explaining that
the University of Virginia contended its confidentiality policies were consistent with FERPA
even as it appointed a working group to review and possibly revise those rules); Sec. on Campus,
Georgetown Univ. Violation, supra note 48 (explaining that Georgetown was making campus
rape victims sign documents agreeing not to talk about the results of their own campus court
hearings).
236. See S. Daniel Carter, University of Virginia Clery Act Complaint Sent to the U.S.
Department of Education, UVA Victims of Rape (Nov. 1, 2004), available at
http://www.uvavictimsofrape.com/Clery%20Act%2OViolation.htm [hereinafter UVA Victims of
Rape] (explaining that accusers of sexual assault must be allowed to re-disclose the facts of their
case and share their personal experiences, as well as the final outcome); Kate Dieringer, Campus
Injustice: A Story of Predatory Rape at Georgetown University, SEC. ON CAMPUS, INC.,

http://www.securityoncampus.org/index.php?option=comcontent&view-article&id=186
(last
visited Aug. 15, 2010) (stating that signing a confidentiality agreement to not discuss the outcome
from the adjudication was detrimental to the healing process).
237. See BEYOND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, supra note 38, at 194-95 (discussing the
peer pressure that may make it difficult for the victim to report an assault, especially since the

perpetrator's friends and peers may rally around the perpetrator and attempt to harass the victim).
238. See Dieringer, supra note 236 (explaining that silencing a victim after they give their
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In 2004, the DOE settled this question in response to a complaint
filed by a student survivor and Security on Campus, Inc. In its
resolution of the complaint, the DOE made clear that such compelled
nondisclosure agreements were illegal under the Clery Act: "Under the
University's policy, a student who refused to execute an agreement
would be barred from receiving judicial outcomes and sanctions
information. As a result, a key aim of the Clery Act-providing access
to key information to be used by affected persons in their recovery
process-is defeated." 239 The DOE confirmed this judgment again in a
November 2008 letter to another university in response to a complaint
regarding a similar policy. In doing so, it stated that, "by requiring
survivors of alleged sexual assaults to abide by a confidentiality policy
that is inconsistent with the letter and spirit of the Clery Act," the school
had violated the Clery Act.240
Despite all of these different pronouncements, in the fall of 2009 and
spring and summer of 2010, I was still being told by people who should
know otherwise that FERPA precluded a student survivor from being
told about the outcome and sanctions of the disciplinary proceeding
regarding her victimization. This might have been a lack of knowledge,
as well as the preference of non-lawyer administrators like these for
bright-line rules (of which FERPA has plenty). Alternatively, it may
have involved active avoidance of this knowledge, either on the part of
the attendees of these workshops (who I am not at all convinced left my
workshops believing that I was right about this supposed conflict), or on
the part of the people who are supposed to train them. Either way, this
constant challenge demonstrates how difficult it may be to move school
officials in a better direction.
In light of this resistance, the law absolutely must create consistent
incentives to encourage schools to adopt institutional responses that will
ultimately help end campus peer sexual violence. The primary liability
scheme surrounding Title IX and the Clery Act creates such incentives,
but information problems exacerbated by these same laws push in the
opposite and wrong direction. The Clery Act must be amended, and
both Title IX and Clery must be enforced differently and better to
change the current incentives toward lack of knowledge and knowledge

trust is to re-victimize the victim).
239. Letter from M. Geneva Coombs, Dir., Case Mgmt. Teams-Northeast, U.S. Dep't of
Educ., to John J. DeGioia, Ph.D, President, Georgetown Univ. (July 16, 2004), available at
http://www.publicintegrity.org/investigations/campus assault/assets/pdf/Clery071604_Georgeto
wn.pdf.
240. UVA Victims of Rape, supra note 236.
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avoidance into incentives for ending the persistent problem of campus
peer sexual violence.

